Wofford College

Digital Commons @ Wofford
Student Scholarship

5-2016

Carthaginian Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune,
Allied Conscripts, and Multi-Ethnic Armies in
Antiquity
Kevin Patrick Emery
Wofford College

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wofford.edu/studentpubs
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, and the
Military History Commons
Recommended Citation
Emery, Kevin Patrick, "Carthaginian Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, Allied Conscripts, and Multi-Ethnic Armies in Antiquity"
(2016). Student Scholarship. Paper 11.
http://digitalcommons.wofford.edu/studentpubs/11

This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Wofford. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Wofford. For more information, please contact stonerp@wofford.edu.

Wofford College
Carthaginian Mercenaries:
Soldiers of Fortune, Allied Conscripts, and Multi-Ethnic Armies in Antiquity

An Honors Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of the Department of History
In Candidacy For
An Honors Degree in History

By
Kevin Patrick Emery

Spartanburg, South Carolina
May 2016

1

Introduction
The story of the mercenary armies of Carthage is one of incompetence and disaster,
followed by clever innovation. It is a story not just of battles and betrayal, but also of the
interactions between dissimilar peoples in a multiethnic army trying to coordinate, fight, and
win, while commanded by a Punic officer corps which may or may not have been competent.
Carthaginian mercenaries are one piece of a larger narrative about the struggle between Carthage
and Rome for dominance in the Western Mediterranean, and their history illustrates the evolution
of the mercenary system employed by the Carthaginian Empire to extend her power and ensure
her survival.
At first the system of recruiting mercenary soldiers was ad hoc, and the armies employed
performed rather poorly in combat. These forces were kept loyal by their Carthaginian
commanders through the taking of hostages, usually the family members of the fighters who
were hired, as well as through promises of wealth in exchange for battlefield valor. Despite these
methods of control, these initial armies proved unreliable and were prone to mutiny, desertion,
and were generally disloyal. From the end of the First Punic war in 241 BCE to the end of the
Second Punic War in 201 BCE, the system used by Carthaginian to recruit, train, and most
importantly control its mercenaries underwent significant change. What had started as simply an
ad hoc tactic of necessity, which produced mixed results on the battlefield and carried a high
probability of mutiny, was transformed first under Hamilcar Barca and later perfected by
Hannibal Barca to create an army that was the epitome of what a mercenary army could achieve.
The Barcid system wove together men and units from diverse nations, languages, religions, and
fighting styles into an army which was almost an extension of their commander’s will.
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The purpose of the mercenary system’s reform was to avoid a repeat of the Mercenary
War in 240 BCE, perhaps the greatest disaster that Carthage ever experienced in its history. The
Mercenary War displayed, quite catastrophically for the Carthaginians, the shortcomings of the
system which did not guarantee the loyalty and discipline of its mercenaries. The mercenary
rebellion was poorly managed by Carthage, and the mercenaries were able to conquer most of
Punic North Africa, threatening Carthage itself. The reason for poor Carthaginian response to the
rebellion lay in the fact that while the Carthaginian military commanders had experience dealing
with and controlling mercenary troops, the political leadership in Carthage did not. For three
years war raged, with mercenaries and rebels ravaging territory up to the walls of Carthage itself.
It was not until Hamilcar Barca, the father of the famous Hannibal Barca, arrived to
command that the war with the mercenaries was finally won. Utilizing a system inspired by the
policies of Xanthippus, a Spartan mercenary captain who saved Carthage from a Roman invasion
during the First Punic War, Hamilcar Barca defeated the mercenaries, though the memory of the
war’s barbarity made it so that the Barcid system would be kept and refined so that another
disaster of the same origin and scale didn’t happen again. What differentiated the Barcid system
from mere generalship is the fact that it was passed down from commander to commander and
steadily built upon, rather than being the work of a single mind.
The new system relied less on hostage taking, and instead reduced the autonomy of
mercenary captains by ensuring they were closely observed by the Carthaginian officer corps.
Additionally, it ensured that the mercenary soldiers were always employed and never idle, and
were personally loyal to their commander by keeping the army constantly on campaign and
ensuring all their pay was distributed by the general and not the state. As a result of these
reforms, which coalesced during Carthage’s campaigns in Iberia, a professional mercenary army
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was formed. It existed for decades before Hannibal Barca famously utilized it to invade Italy
over the Alps. It was during this campaign where the reformed mercenary system, combined
with Hannibal Barca’s excellent leadership, where the potential of the mercenary army was
realized in an army which nearly brought Rome to its knees. Inspired by the actions of
Xanthippus during the First Punic War, honed by Hamilcar and Hasdrubal Barca, the full
potential of a professional, Punic, multi-ethnic force was realized by Hannibal in three great
battles: Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae. While Hannibal’s army seems unprecedented and unique
in the ancient world, it was actually the culmination of a Punic system which took decades to
develop.
Study of the mercenary armies of Carthage is a poorly researched area of ancient history,
and secondary sources are scant on the subject. General histories of Carthage or the Punic Wars
touch on them, some devoting a few pages, but these do not look at the mercenary system in
critical depth. Two of the best sources for Carthaginian mercenaries are Adrian Goldsworthy’s
The Fall of Carthage, which is a military history of the Punic Wars, and Dexter Hoyos’s
Truceless War, which deals in extreme detail with the Mercenary War. Neither of these works,
however, traces the development and evolution of the mercenary system over time. While a few
sources acknowledge Hamilcar’s role in reforming and improving the way that mercenaries were
employed, few go into detail on how, and fewer still point to Xanthippus as helping provide a
framework for these changes. While many historians look at Carthage’s military as part of a
larger effort to understand Rome’s military, few examine the Carthaginian military separately.
Hoyos is almost the only author working on the Carthaginian military for its own sake.
Compounding this difficulty is the shortage of ancient sources that detail the Punic Wars,
and the Carthaginian mercenaries specifically. Polybius is the main source, and the most reliable,
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and this paper draws heavily from his work. Polybius was friend of the grandson of Scipio
Africanus, a witness to the Third Punic War, and had access to Greek and Punic sources. Second
is Livy, who despite his detailed accounts is considered somewhat unreliable. Other ancient
authors like Cassius Dio and Appian write centuries after the events they describe, and are not
particularly useful for this study. Nevertheless, a through and compelling picture, and
corresponding argument, of Carthage’s mercenary system and how that system evolved over
time can be painted. The mercenary armies of Carthage grew into a professional, efficient force
as a result of steady reforms implemented primarily by the Barcid family in response to the
lessons of the First Punic War and the Mercenary War.
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Chapter One: Carthaginian Expansion- The Beginning of an Empire
The city-state of Carthage rose to dominate the ancient Western Mediterranean through
trade, naval supremacy, and war. Through trade networks, Carthage had contact with the martial
cultures of the Ancient Mediterranean world. The same nodes used to buy and sell goods could
also be used to hire mercenaries, especially when those mercenaries were attracted by the vast
trade wealth controlled by Carthage. In Carthage’s wars, the city-state relied primarily on multiethnic mercenary armies.
The history of Carthage is often preserved in the historical memory by later Roman and
Greek (especially Sicilian) historians, who perpetuated negative stereotypes of Carthaginians as,
in the words of Richard Miles, “treacherous and deceitful practitioners of doublespeak. Like their
Phoenician cousins, they are overly controlled by women and liable to suffer from such feminine
traits as hysteria and envy.”1 Despite such prejudice, bias can be filtered out of existing sources,
and archaeological evidence combined with the more reliable surviving sources such as Polybius
and sections of Livy, give a clear if not complete picture of ancient Carthage.
Carthage began to expand territorially around the 600s BCE, taking over nearby Libya
and other Punic settlements from its home territory in Tunisia. Carthage had taken over Libya
quite soon (when exactly is not known, but certainly before the 500s BCE). Libyans were
conscripted to fight in Carthage’s Wars, and made up the main body of the Carthaginian
mercenary armies in the First Punic War, fighting side by side with foreign sell-swords.2 Many
Libyans would appear to have signed up for continued service as mercenaries when their
conscription times ran out. Libya was not complacent with its subject status however, and

1

Miles, Richard. 2011. Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization. New York: Viking.
60.
2
Polybius, 1.67
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Libyans were incited to rebellion against Carthage in the Mercenary War (also called the
“Truceless War”) of 241 to 238 BCE.3 The Libyan cities had borne the brunt of the immense
taxes required to finance the First Punic War, and Libyan men whose families could not pay
were arrested by the Carthaginians in droves.4 In revolt, the Libyan cities gave aid to the
mutinous mercenaries, bloodily revolting against their Carthaginian masters and eventually
fighting so ruthlessly that no quarter was given to the Carthaginians. The vehemence of this
revolt implies fierce resentment of the Libyans toward the Carthaginians prior to the First Punic
War, and indicates that Carthaginian rule was conspicuously oppressive.
Much like its mercenary armies, the state of Carthage was not a homogenous empire, but
rather an amalgamation of different ethnic peoples with different legal statuses and varying
degrees of autonomy. The group with the most power was the citizen body of Carthage itself,
which controlled trade and political power. Following the citizens, native peoples whose cities
used Carthaginian laws (and were subject to Carthage) were second-highest. Their use of the
Carthaginian law code necessarily made them equal to Carthaginian citizens in civil law.5 Most
of these people are what are known as Libyphoenicians, who usually lived in cities.6 Tribes
allied to Carthage, such as the Numidians or some Celtiberians, were treated well or ill
depending on Carthaginian strategic interests. Despite the multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan nature of
its trading hubs and mercenary armies, Carthage, in the words of Walter Ameling “lived on its
dominance over others, not on the services it performed for others.”7 In addition to the
Carthaginian citizens and the Libyphoenicians, Numidians, native non-Greek Sicilians, Balearic
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Miles, Richard. Carthage Must Be Destroyed. xii.
Polybius, 1.72
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Ameling, Walter. “The Rise of Carthage to 264.” In Hoyos, B. D. A Companion to the Punic Wars. Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. 47.
6
Ibid, 47.
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Islanders, Sardinians, and Celtiberians all lived within the Carthaginian Empire and its sphere of
influence. Despite the cosmopolitan nature of Carthage’s trade hubs, societies which were
opposed to Carthage’s wealth and expansion were harshly dealt with. For example, the native
Nuragic peoples of Sardinia were quickly driven from their coastal communities into the
Sardinian hills after Punic settlers began arriving on the island.8 As a result of Punic expansion
into their territory, the Nuragic culture soon disappeared entirely.9 When wealth failed, Carthage
was not hesitant to resort to intimidation and force to keep its subject peoples in check.
Carthage was also well positioned geographically to expand, with weak neighbors to its
east and west, friendly Punic colonies across the sea, and the vast, largely untapped wealth of
Iberia nearby. By the fifth century BCE, Carthage had come to dominate all the other Phoenician
towns and settlements in North Africa. It took immediate interest in the Mediterranean islands,
notably Sardinia and the Balearic islands.10 The primary concern guiding Carthaginian expansion
seems to have been mercantile rather than militaristic or administrative in nature. Carthage
expanded its sway to include the other Punic settlements in Sicily and on the North African
coast, including Utica. It founded its own colonies in North Africa as well, such as Leptis
Magna.11 Trade gave Carthage and its oligarchic ruling elite great wealth. It also created a web of
personal, economic, and political connections which linked Carthage to the many martial
cultures of antiquity. These links and personal connections were also utilized to hire soldiers,
who were attracted by the vast wealth controlled by Carthage.
The Need for Mercenaries

8
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The mercenary armies of Carthage were formed in a kind of ad hoc fashion when the
need arose, at least initially in the city’s history. When a conflict broke out, or a new war goal
emerged, Carthage would recruit an army of mercenaries and non-citizen levies (usually
Libyans) and send them off to fight. Unlike its navy, which was a standing professional force,
always in existence, the armies of Carthage were created when they were needed, each with a
unique mix of different nationalities, and disbanded when the conflict was resolved.
Carthage was forced to rely on mercenaries to fight its wars on land for a few reasons.
First, the Punic citizen body was relatively small compared to the citizen bodies of their Sicilian
Greek or Roman enemies, and could ill afford to sustain losses. Paid foreigners were more
expendable, if less trustworthy. Carthage was also immensely rich from its trade connections and
fertile North African farmland and had the coin to pay for the sometimes expensive mercenaries.
Carthage relied overwhelmingly on mercenaries and allied levies, though she did tap her
domestic manpower as well. Her citizens fought in a hoplite phalanx formation, though these
units of citizens were only deployed when the city was in extreme and immediate danger, such as
when the Romans or Greeks were poised to attack Carthage itself. When deployed, the citizen
phalanxes fought rather poorly. This was likely due to their relative lack of experience, as the
citizen body of Carthage focused much of its effort on politics rather than war. Carthage did
experiment with a small force of highly trained infantrymen called the Sacred Band, though this
force was slaughtered to a man at the Battle of Crimissus in 340 BCE, which was part of the
Carthaginian campaigns in Sicily.12 This disaster destroyed a good portion of the Carthaginian
citizen elite in a single battle, and virtually eliminated Carthage’s regular use of citizen soldiers.

12

Ibid, 137
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Not only did mercenaries perform better than Carthage’s citizen soldiers, they were more
expendable.
Carthaginian Government
The government of Carthage was complex, and there much still not understood about it,
despite intense scholarship. Older Greek texts refer to the ‘kings’ of Carthage, though most
attribute this as a Greek confusion over Carthaginian oligarchy.13
The government of Carthage was that of an aristocracy and a city-state. Its legislature
was composed of many aristocratic assemblies, such as the Council of 104, as well as many
magistrates which controlled foreign affairs, the treasury, the navy, and other major services.
While an apparently democratic citizens assembly did exist, it does not appear to have held much
power. Executive power was held in peace time by suffetes, which appear to have been elected,
and in wartime was effectively held (though whether or not by election is not clear) by generals
such as Hamilcar Barca, who were given orders by the government, but could sometimes ignore
or creatively interpret those orders. For most of Carthage’s history, however, her politics were
dominated by a single family. Prior to its conflicts with Rome, the Carthaginian state was
dominated by the Magonids and then the Hannonids, but these families each fell from power
after successive disasters in the Sicilian Wars. After the Hannonid family’s demise, the state was
ruled by a coalition of aristocratic families, who variously cooperated in the wars against Rome
while attempting to accumulate power and glory for themselves. Finally, after the devastation the
First Punic War and the Mercenary War which ensued, the Barcid family gained effective
control of the state. Consisting famously of Hamilcar and Hannibal Barca, the Barca family was
the last great political family of Carthage.

13

Lancel, Serge. Carthage: A History. Oxford. Blackwell, 1995. 117.
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Supporting the government of Carthage was its mercenary armies, composed of a mixture
of foreign-born professionals, Libyan conscripts, and allied contingents. These armies allowed
the government of the Carthaginian Empire to exert influence over the land just as her navy
exerted power over the sea. An understanding of how ancient Carthaginian mercenary forces
operated and how ancient battles were fought is crucial to understanding the system as a whole
and how it developed over time.
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Chapter 2: Carthaginian Mercenaries and Ancient Warfare
Mercenary work was one of the few steady careers in the ancient world.14 It was a
dangerous line of work, but the opportunity for wealth and advancement was far greater than the
life of a farmer or an artisan. Mercenaries could serve for decades, often having their families
stay in the cities of their employer. Hoyos recounts that some Gauls who served in the First
Punic War turned up some twenty years later still fighting (with a different employer) in the
Adriatic.15 War was good business, and most mercenaries were professional troops, usually only
deserting under extreme circumstances.16
The ad hoc, multiethnic armies of Carthage (each unique, each created with a specific
mission in mind) would seem at first glance to be merely a product of the geo-political and
economic constraints in which Carthage found herself. The argument is easy enough to make. A
merchant republic, constrained by a lack of manpower but overflowing with currency, would
certainly resort to hiring foreign soldiers to serve in its wars.
The mercenary forces used by Carthage, however, are unique and worthy of study in
several ways. As Goldsworthy points out, the mercenary forces used by Carthage were almost
entirely non-Carthaginian, and were instead amalgamations of ethnic peoples, each with their
own tactics, weapons, culture, and language. Each mercenary army was created to deal with
different conflicts, so every army in Carthaginian history had different ethnic and unit
compositions.17

14

Hoyos, B. D. 2007. Truceless War: Carthage's Fight for Survival, 241 to 237 BC. Vol. 45. Boston;Leiden;:
Brill.Press. 8.
15
Ibid.
16
The exception to this rule are allied tribesmen, who were more fickle in their service.
17
Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146 BC. London: Cassel. 2003. 31-35.
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The mercenary armies of Carthage started and were first employed as a reaction to the
geographic, financial, and political straits that Carthage found herself in. A lack of manpower,
combined with great wealth (generated from Mediterranean trade, bountiful North African
agriculture, and later conquest in Iberia) made mercenary armies a sensible and obvious tool for
Carthage’s many wars. During the Sicilian Wars, the mercenary units did not perform with the
effectiveness and distinction they would later show. In the First Punic War, the flaws of the
institution were revealed, as Carthage consistently could not defeat their Roman enemy on land.
Xanthippus, a Spartan mercenary who served Carthage briefly, delivered one of the few
Carthaginian victories in the First Punic War, defeating the Roman invasion of Libya. Almost
certainly inspired by the system used by Xanthippus, Hamilcar Barca (father of Hannibal Barca)
began reforming the institution of the mercenary army, drilling it into an effective fighting force.
His reforms began during the First Punic War in Sicily but did not fully develop until after the
conclusion of the Mercenary War. After the Mercenary War, Hamilcar campaigned heavily in
Iberia, subjugating many tribes, in some cases adding their captured warriors to his own army.
Difficulty Commanding the Army
The only unifying element of a Carthaginian mercenary army was the general, and the
small Punic officer corps. The men in the army could and would come from vastly different
backgrounds, some Celts, some Numidians, some Libyans, some Iberians, and some Greek
veterans. Management of supplies and logistics, communication and unit organization, were all
of crucial importance to the Carthaginian general. Such a task seems daunting, but many
commanders were no doubt inspired to succeed, not least because the punishment for failure was
death by crucifixion.18

18

Ibid, 35.
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The challenges for any general commanding an ancient army were manifold, all the more
so an army of mercenaries. First, there was the difficulty of communication between armies and
the government. It could take weeks for a message to be delivered, and often commanders were
ignorant of the conditions in the field. Supply and logistics were another area of major concern,
as finding food and supplies for an army of tens of thousands was a constant concern. For an
example of the amounts of supplies an army of antiquity would require, it is estimated that an
army of 20,000 men, with some 2,000 cavalry, would consume about 55 tons of grain a day.19
That was just the food. Additional supplies, from ammunition to cooking utensils also had to be
procured. Some armies were supplied directly either by land or ship, but other armies, such as
Hannibal Barca’s army, had to forage for their supplies. For these armies, instead of grain, vast
herds of cattle would be employed, as this food source could move by hoof with the army.
Foraging was difficult to accomplish in some terrain however, and large armies ultimately
needed a base of supply in order to operate effectively.
Finally, there was the risk of mutiny and disloyalty among the mercenaries. Mercenary
mutinies pop up throughout the history of Carthage’s wars. Polybius asserts that the original
intention of a multiethnic mercenary force was to erect linguistic and cultural barriers between
the troops so no large component of the army could collaborate with another and easily affect a
mutiny.20 This alone did not create a sufficient barrier for mutiny, and later Barcid reforms were
necessary to ensure loyalty, including encouraging mercenaries to feel a personal connection to
their general, reducing the independence of mercenary captains, and ensuring regular pay.
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Erdkamp, Paul. “Manpower and Food Supply in the First and Second Punic Wars” in Hoyos, B. D. A Companion to
the Punic Wars. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. 68.
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This sharply contrasts with the Roman model of a citizen army, where each rank of
soldiers has an assigned task and standard deployment. Despite a more ordered and stronger
infantry army, Roman generals in its wars (until the middle of the Second Punic War) were
forced to consult the gods through taking the auspices before a decision could be reached.21
Carthaginian commanders and their armies were, earlier in their history, not so
successful. This is due to a combination of the unprofessional nature of most of Carthage’s
generals, and the lack of an effective, institutionalized system for keeping potentially mutinous
mercenaries under control. Most of Carthage’s power was derived from its navy, and so the army
received less attention as a result (though this would change after the First Punic War). When
fighting trained soldiers, mercenaries and their commanders performed rather poorly, as the
troublesome wars in Sicily prior and the First Punic War illustrate.
Goldsworthy makes a compelling argument that when initially formed, a Carthaginian
mercenary army was ineffectual, as the various elements within it had little cohesion or
experience fighting alongside each other.22 However, the longer the army campaigned and the
more accustomed the various elements of the army became to fighting alongside one another, the
more effectual the army became. Lending weight to this thesis is the fact that the most
impressive army in Carthaginian history, that of Hannibal Barca in the Second Punic War, had
been fighting in Iberia for over a decade before it famously crossed the Alps.
To speak of the armies of Carthage as simply consisting of foreign mercenaries is a slight
simplification. The army was composed of men raised in different ways, each motivated to fight
by different reasons. While hired foreign mercenaries were used extensively, they were by no
means the only component of the army. In addition to being hired, foreigners were provided to

21
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Milne, Kathryn. Lecture, Wofford College.
Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Fall of Carthage. 34-35.
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the army by allied kingdoms, or provided by treaty obligations as seems to have been the case
with the Numidians. With the Numidians as well as the Iberians later, marriage alliances between
tribes and the Carthaginian commanders was a way of getting troops, as well as the personal
loyalties of the tribe.23 Men might join (or be into conscripted as some Libyans were) a
Carthaginian army for wealth, for adventure, to fight a hated enemy, or to escape their homes.

23

Ibid. 33.
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Chapter Three: The Multi-Ethnic Nature of a Carthaginian Army
Certain peoples from different parts of the Carthaginian Empire and recruitment network
were usually hired to fulfill certain roles. Thus, different parts of the armies were associated with
different ethnicities, who had specific roles within the army and had to work together cohesively
to have any chance of victory. While the deployment of a Carthaginian army varied considerably
based on the commander, situation, and army composition, certain deployment details remained
constant. While there cannot be said to be a “standard” Carthaginian deployment, elephants were
almost always positioned in the front of an army and began the battle with a massed charge.
Cavalry was almost always deployed on the flanks of the infantry formations. What the cavalry
and infantry formations were comprised of depended on the ethnicities and background of the
levies and mercenaries who comprised the army. Nevertheless, the ethnicity of the troops
mattered. The wide array of different peoples, especially troops like the Balearic Islanders and
the Numidians, gave Carthaginian mercenary armies a large number of specialist troops which
gave the mercenary army a certain inherent flexibility, provided the units could properly
coordinate.
The Numidians
The Numidian people lived in what is today Algeria and Morocco. An ancient Berber
Kingdom, their lands were on the Western border of Carthaginian territory. Their people were
divided into many tribes, of which two seemed to share most of the power, at least according to
Polybius. The names of these two tribes are the Massylii and the Masaesyli, and did not unify
until the Second Punic War.
The Numidians were famous for their light cavalry. The Numidian cavalry peppered their
opponents with barrages of javelins. If the enemy attempted to attack the Numidians, they would
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scatter, only to reform and deliver another volley. Though the tribal Numidian horsemen were
formidable, they were also somewhat notorious for switching sides in a battle. Polybius even
states that they as a people were “neither constant toward Gods or men.”24 It was a Numidian
prince at Zama (Hannibal’s last battle), Masinissa, who helped to turn Hannibal’s defeat into a
crushing rout.25 During the Mercenary War it was a Numidian defector, Naravas, which provided
the Carthaginians the ability to quell the mutiny.26 During the Second Punic War and after,
Numidia remained politically unstable, as kings from either tribe warred for power in the
supposedly unified kingdom. Despite the inclination toward treachery, Numidian horsemen were
potent forces on the battlefield, described by Livy as “the best horsemen in all of Africa.”27
Despite Numidia being a client state of Carthage, the Numidians were not as rebellious as the
Libyans, and contributed decisively to the outcomes of Hannibal Barca’s early battles in Italy.
The Celtiberians
The Iberians, who lived in what is today Spain and Portugal, had a long historical
association with the Punic civilization. The Iberian Peninsula was rich in mineral resources,
which the Phoenicians as well as the Carthaginians traded for and exploited. While Punic
colonists had settled parts of the Spanish coastline, the Celtiberians occupied the central Spanish
plateau. The Celtiberians were descended from a mixture of Celtic migrants and native Iberian
peoples. By the time of the First Punic War, they had developed a unique culture. Spanish
mercenaries provided Carthaginian (and occasionally Roman) armies with heavy infantry, light
infantry, and cavalry. Common soldiers wore a white tunic with a belt and leather shield, while
nobles typically equipped themselves with armor in the Greek style. Spanish heavy infantry wore
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a variation of Lamellar armor, or chainmail armor (the latter being an improvement over the
Celtic design). Celtiberian heavy infantry closely resembled the Roman Principes; equipped with
a heavy shield which provided full body cover, they also carried a long javelin called a
solliferum, which they would hurl before joining in melee.28
The most distinctive aspect of a Celtiberian soldier, however, was his sword, the falcata.
Made of high quality Spanish iron, the weapon was superb for close quarters fighting. Hannibal
was so impressed with the weapon that he equipped his own soldiers with it in the Second Punic
War. Gabriel even suggests that Hannibal’s victory at Cannae was due to this sword’s superiority
over the Greek design the Romans used at the time.29 After the capture of Carthago Nova, (Latin
for New Carthage) Carthage’s main colony in Iberia, Scipio ordered the sword be made by
Iberian smiths and equipped into his own army.30 With a few modifications, the falcata would
later come into use in the Roman legions as the gladius hispanicus, the main weapon of Rome’s
legions.31
In addition to their skill with infantry, the Celtiberians possessed marvelous cavalry,
perhaps the best a mercenary army could acquire. The heavy cavalry was armed with lances and
falcatas and was called Jinetes. Iberia was good horse country and the Celtiberian armies were
well known for using their infantry and cavalry in concert. A favorite tactic, used at the battle of
the Trebia River and by Mago at Cannae, was to have a second soldier ride on the horse’s back,
and then dismount to fight on foot.32 Iberian mounts were ridden without a saddle, (as the saddle
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hadn’t been invented yet) and were used to the hard and mountainous terrain of their native
country. Flexible and powerful, the Celtiberian heavy cavalry was a potent force.
The Celtiberian light cavalry was as tricky as the heavy cavalry was powerful. Used for
harassing enemy forces and riding down a fleeing enemy, the Celtiberian light cavalry was
armed with a throwing javelin and little armor. Relying on speed and surprise, these troops were
known for striking at vulnerable points and exhausting more heavily armored opponents. The
Celtiberian light cavalry would ride in a circle around an enemy infantry formation, hurling
javelins at the exposed sides of the infantrymen. The infantry, terrified and restrained within their
formation, could do little to repel the attack.
A third type of cavalry combat, employed by light and heavy units, was to use their
horses for swift maneuvers, getting around the enemy’s flank or rear, before dismounting and
fighting on foot. This form of battle is mentioned by Polybius in his description of Cannae, 33
where he described the Carthaginian Iberian horsemen on the left wing of the battle dismounting
to fight their Roman adversaries, who likewise dismounted for the melee (which the Romans lost
terribly). Polybius does mention, however, that this style was not the usual form of cavalry
combat.34
The Balearic Islanders
The people of the Balearic Islands, Majorca, Minorca, Ibiza, and Formentera, were
renowned in the ancient world as expert slingers. Ethnically they were very mixed, with early
Punic settlers intermingling with the native population of the islands, which had existed there at
least since the early Bronze Age. Balearic males trained from infancy to be able to use the sling
effectively in combat. The main export of the islands, in fact, were mercenary slingers, first in
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the service of Carthage, and later in the Roman legions.35 A Greek legend said that Balearic
mothers would not allow their children to eat unless they struck some bread off of a target with a
sling.
Slings had numerous advantages over other ranged weapons of the ancient world, like
javelins and arrows, especially for the poor islanders. Ammunition, which consisted either of
round smooth stones or metal bullets, was extremely inexpensive and easily obtained. The
manufacture of a sling was also very inexpensive, and could easily be carried. Slingers carried
slings made of different materials of different lengths to achieve effectiveness at different ranges:
long, medium, and short.36 Thus lightly armed and equipped, quick footed slingers could harass
their opponents without fear of putting themselves in danger. Some slingers would even inscribe
messages on their sling bullets with phrases like “Take that!” and “Ow!”
The Celts
The Celts, an Indo-European people, experienced a massive migration into Europe,
settling in a variety of areas, from Thrace to Britain. Considered to be barbarians by the Greeks
and Romans, the Celts actually had a sophisticated society, culture, and religion. There was
never a unified Celtic nation, rather, the Celtic people were divided into a number of tribes, with
a vast number of petty chiefs. While this political disunity made it difficult for the Celts to
organize themselves militarily, it did make them easier to hire as mercenaries. Celts were hired
to fight for a large number of empires and states.
The Celts living in Cisalpine Gaul, that is, the Celtic territory in northern Italy, are
described by Polybius as living in open semi-nomadic villages. A race of cattle herders, these
Celts were the peoples who joined with Hannibal to make war against the Romans.
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The Celts were known for their skill in iron-smithing, and their skill in horsemanship.
Celts from the Po valley in northern Italy, what the Romans called Cisalpine Gaul served in
Hannibal’s army after it crossed the Alps, and formed his army’s center at Cannae.37 The Celtic
warrior carried into battle javelins and a shield, but relied primarily on long slashing swords.38
Despite fighting in a massed formation, Celtic swordsmen focused on individual combat rather
than on fighting as part of a formation, and it evidently took Hannibal more than a year to
accustom his Celts to fighting together as part of a formation. The long slashing swords
encouraged individualized fighting, as they required a large amount of personal space to wield
effectively, which a tight formation prohibited. The Celtic cavalry, as well as the Celtiberian
cavalry, were superb but undisciplined, and tended to rely on the all-out charge to defeat their
opponents.39
The Greeks
Contact and exchange between the Punic and Hellenistic worlds had existed long before
Carthage’s mercenary armies. Greeks and Carthaginians participated in trade and competed
against each other in colonization. It is no surprise then that many Greeks served in Carthage’s
armies, lured by wealth, adventure, or pushed into the mercenary life by desperation.
Although Polybius reports that the Greeks who had served as foot soldiers in Carthage’s
mercenary armies were the worst of Greeks, mostly deserters and slaves, the competence and
success of these troops would tend to argue otherwise.40 The Carthaginians seemed to have
admired the Hellenistic style of battle, perhaps attempting to model the successes of Alexander
the Great. The Carthaginian citizens units, some Libyan conscripts, as well as their Greek
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mercenaries, deployed in a hoplite phalanx, though there is little evidence they employed the
longer Macedonian sarissa spears, implying an earlier Hellenistic influence.41 This hoplite
phalanx differed from the Roman three-lined maniple system by placing soldiers in one dense
line, raising the morale of the Carthaginian troops while intimidating their opponents through the
depth and size of the single formation.42 Armed with heavy shields and body armor, hoplites
fought primarily with a spear and with a sword as a secondary weapon. Attacking a hoplite wall
from the front was a difficult task, though the formation lacked the capability and flexibility to
maneuver well, and was particularly vulnerable to attacks in the flanks and rear. For this reason
especially Carthaginian armies required a strong presence of cavalry on their flanks to guard
their hoplites.
Greeks served particularly admirably in the First Punic War. It was an unnamed Greek
soldier who, during the siege of Lilybaeum, whose idea to use flaming projectiles during a high
wind caused the immolation of the Roman siege works.43 It was Xanthippus, a Spartan, who
saved all of Carthage by instilling discipline in the mercenaries and correcting the previous
commanders of the Carthaginian armies in the Carthaginian armies and defeating the invading
Roman army in Africa commanded by Marcus Atilius Regulus. Greek historians accompanied
Hannibal on his march over the Alps, and Greek city-states in Italy defected to Hannibal’s cause
after the great victory at Cannae.
The Libyans
While mercenaries from a diverse range of regions and cultures were attracted to service
in the Carthaginian mercenary army, the main body of the army was usually made up of Libyan
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soldiers. Libyans were the steadiest source of manpower for Carthage, and Libyans formed one
of the most disciplined and experienced parts of the army.44 Libyans served in a variety of roles,
serving as skirmishers or in the hoplite wall. Despite the fact that some of these men were
conscripted, they appeared to have been promised good pay for their service, and were rewarded
if they were conspicuously brave.45 While Polybius mentions the tributes that Libyan cities were
required to pay to Carthage, he does not specify whether these payments took the form of goods
or cash, and it seems there is no reason to doubt that Libyan cities were also required to provide a
certain number of soldiers for Carthage as well.
Libyan infantry fought with long spears and round or oval shields, and protected
themselves with linen cuirasses and metal helmets. Fighting in close configuration, the Libyan
infantry could present a formidable defensive formation to the enemy. The Libyan cavalry also
fought in close order and equipped themselves with long spears. The cavalry was trained to
deliver disciplined shock charges.46
The ethnic makeup of a Carthaginian armies varied immensely, sometimes even year by
year. Yet these would be the forces with which Carthage waged her wars against her enemies:
first the Sicilian Greeks and then later the Roman Republic.
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Chapter Four: Adventures in Sicily 480-307 BCE
Long before Carthage’s bloody conflicts with Rome, Carthage fought a series of wars
with the Greek settlements along the eastern shore of Sicily. These wars mark an important step
in the development of the Carthaginian mercenary army. The first Sicilian war is the first
recorded use of mercenaries by Carthage, while the second Sicilian war employed so many
mercenaries (far more than the first) that Carthage was required to mint its own coins for the first
time in order to pay the soldiers.
Mercenaries on both sides proved unreliable, even in the face of victory. When the
Syracusan general Agathocles laid siege to Carthage in 309 BCE, the Carthaginians simply
bought his own troops out from under him, resulting in a great victory which ejected the Greeks
permanently from North Africa.47
The First Sicilian War
The first recorded use of mercenaries in Carthaginian warfare shows the Punic
commanders employing their mercenary armies incompetently. In 480 BCE, at the battle of
Himera, the entire Carthaginian army, which was composed of Greeks and Celts, was destroyed
and its leader killed. The reason for this disaster was that the commander of the mercenary army,
a certain Hamilcar, set off with such haste that the mercenary elements of his army had not time
to harmonize.48 The mercenaries and likely could not fight together well at all. Rather than
leading a unified army in a surprise attack, Hamilcar was killed leading a large dis-unified mob
into a prepared enemy. The first recorded use of mercenaries was a disaster, though this did not
deter Carthage from their use, or inspire Carthage to any innovation.
The Second Sicilian War- An Army in Mint Condition
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The Carthaginians again attempted war and conquest in Sicily in 410 BCE. For the war
effort, Hannibal49 conscripted a levy of 5,000 Libyans and 800 Campanians (Italian Greeks),
which was aided by a second army which consisted of a mixed force of Iberian mercenaries and
more Libyan levies. In 409 BCE, an armada of 1,500 transport ships loaded with the army and its
supplies, including siege engines, set sail.50 Unfortunately for this campaign, the sole source is
Timaeus, a Sicilian historian who was very anti-Carthaginian.51
Hannibal’s army, despite being recently formed, fought with far greater success than the
army which had been destroyed fifty years prior at Himera. The army’s took the city of Selinus.
The city was captured quickly, with the Carthaginian army competently employing siege engines
to take the city by assault. According to Diodorus (working through Timaeus) the multiethnic
mercenary army fought skillfully if brutally, and by the end of the day the city streets were
clogged with 16,000 corpses, including the Selintine women and children.52 Although Timaeus
attributes this massacre to Carthaginian orders, it may also have been a collapse of discipline
which led to the massacre.
Hannibal then assaulted Himera, the location of the previous Sicilian War’s disaster.
Many of the inhabitants fled on ships to Syracuse, while the rest fought desperately to hold the
city, which fell on the third day of fighting. Again, relying on the hostile testimony of Timaeus,
Hannibal supposedly ordered the entire city razed and had the temples pillaged. The army then
returned to Africa and disbanded.
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Despite the limited nature of this expedition, it marks an important point in Carthaginian
mercenary warfare. Carthage’s extensive use of mercenaries in this conflict, which topped the
first Sicilian war handily, required the first production of Carthaginian coins to pay the soldiers.53
As the primary purpose of this historic minting was to pay mercenaries, Carthage copied
the designs of the highly valued Greek coinage. The coins bore two inscriptions “Qrthdst”
meaning Carthage, and “Qrthdst/mhnt” which meant Carthage military camp, evidence that the
coins were really for a single purpose.54 Payment of mercenaries would be a constant difficulty
for the Carthaginians, especially over long conflicts.
Agathocles
Perhaps the greatest threat Carthage faced before the Punic Wars was when an army of
Sicilian Greeks landed in Libya and brought the fight to Africa itself. This army, led by the
tyrant of Syracuse, a man named Agathocles, invaded the Carthaginian homeland in North
Africa in 311 BCE. Taking with him his own multiethnic force of Greeks and mercenaries,
Agathocles hoped to put an end to the Punic menace by attacking the Punic heartland in Africa.
The Carthaginian mercenaries and Punic officers lost a number of set piece battles in Africa to
Agathocles, who, receiving reinforcements from rebellious Libyan communities, laid siege to
Carthage itself.55
Carthage’s armies continued to fare poorly against Agathocles. The city was only saved
by a mistake on Agathocles’s part, when he ordered troops away from the siege of Carthage to
secure the rest of Africa before the city had been taken. Agathocles’s army was then attacked and
driven back. Timaeus records that Agathocles, fearing for his life, fled back to Syracuse out of
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cowardice, though this account is likely not fair to Agathocles. The army of Agathocles was then
stopped from destroying Carthage when the Carthaginians simply spent a large sum of money to
make the army go away. The mercenaries were offered clemency and a signing bonus if they
joined the Carthaginian cause. Carthage’s greatest crisis prior to the Punic wars would not be
solved by military innovation or tactical action, but rather through mercenaries’ lust for coin. The
mercenary system as a whole remained unreliable, and the performance of Punic generals
remained lackluster.
Despite this lack of achievement in the long and bloody wars in Sicily and against the
Greeks, the institution would not undergo much development. It would not be until the First
Punic War that the institution would begin to evolve.
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Chapter Five: The First Punic War- Xanthippus and Hamilcar
Polybius
The main primary source for the First and Second Punic Wars is the Greek historian
Polybius. Polybius was born around 200 BCE and died sometime after 118 BCE. He lived
through a time of profound change for the Roman state. Over the course of his life, he saw Rome
transformed from a fairly powerful regional state into an empire that dominated the
Mediterranean and most of the known world. In Polybius’s younger years, he was a member of
the elite aristocracy of Megalopolis, a Greek city-state in a period when the autonomy of those
city-states was receding, replaced by Roman dominion.56 By the time Polybius came of age, the
Punic Wars had been over for at least a quarter century. In his writing of the histories,
acknowledged by scholars as one of the best sources on the Punic Wars, Polybius is also fairly
careful to try to understand the motivations and machinations of all sides and characters in his
histories, and he presents one of the most objective histories of surviving ancient authors. More
than this, Polybius delivers more than simply a collection of stories and facts that he has
collected from other sources. He was also a participant in the Third Punic War, and was present
for the final destruction of Carthage by Rome in 146 BCE. In addition, he befriended Scipio
Aemilianus, the Roman general who defeated Carthage in the Third Punic War and the adopted
grandson of Scipio Africanus, who defeated Hannibal at Zama.57 Furthermore, Polybius reveals
more about his methods and sources than any other ancient historian. He devotes an entire book,
Book 12, to discuss the proper methods for collecting and writing history.58 He discusses how his
methods are an improvement over previous authors, and appears quite knowledgeable about the
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proper practice of historiography. The object of his work was to describe how Rome rose to
dominate the Mediterranean, and the Greeks, and his history is meant as a practical one, to help
inform a Greek audience about how the current state of affairs came to be.59 Polybius sees the
First Punic War as the first crucial stepping stone in Rome’s trajectory, and begins his history
there.
Mercenaries in the First Punic War
The First Punic War was the first of three major conflicts between Rome and Carthage.
Most of the fighting in the First Punic war was confined to Sicily, though the Romans would
later stage an invasion of Africa. In the war, the Carthaginians would rely almost wholly on their
mercenary armies, while Rome would utilize its armies of citizen soldiers. The Carthaginian
mercenaries performed with variable success on land, occasionally winning victories over the
Romans. More often, however, the Carthaginian mercenary armies would be troubled by the
same scourges of mutiny and incompetence which hampered Carthaginian efforts in the Sicilian
Wars. These trends continued until the end of the First Punic War, and after, culminating in the
unparalleled disaster that was the Mercenary War.
The only two clear exceptions to the lackluster records of Carthaginian mercenary armies
are the armies led by Xanthippus and Hamilcar Barca. Xanthippus instituted a system, which
seems to have been quite novel for the Carthaginians, of discipline and unit coordination which
allowed him defeat the Roman general Regulus in North Africa in 255 BCE. Xanthippus did this
by superbly maneuvering the “separate detachments” of his forces, recognizing the flexibility to
be gained from a heterogeneous army.60 By making sure the detachments fought well together,
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and not just separately, Xanthippus inspired his troops. Hamilcar, inspired by this system,
adopted aspects of it in his later campaigns in Panormous and Mount Eryx from 247-241 BCE.
Evidence for the poor leadership and discipline of Carthaginian mercenary armies is
provided in the first battle of the war, the siege of Agrigentum. In particular, the battle showcases
that while fighting effectiveness of the individual mercenary companies was adequate, the lack
of discipline and unit coordination doomed the army. The skill of the Punic commander was that
of a talented amateur, and the army as a whole frequently could not carry out their commander’s
orders as he intended.
The Carthaginians began the war by recruiting and sending a massive number of Celts
and Iberians to Sicily to fight and maintain Punic control. While the loss of a mercenary army for
Carthage was quite expensive, new recruits do not seem to have been especially hard to find.
Polybius says that a large number of Celts from Cisalpine Gaul and a still larger number of
Iberians came to fight. The Carthaginians concentrated their forces, both Celtic and African,
around Agrigentum.61 The Romans moved their army in to lay siege.
The Roman army laid siege to the city around harvest time, and so sent a large number of
soldiers to go and forage. The Celtic mercenaries, recent arrivals from Liguria who were
exceeding in bravery but lacking in discipline, attacked the Roman forage parties, causing many
causalities and forcing the Romans to retreat to their trenches. The Celts were not supposed to
attack, however, and acted against orders.62 This lack of discipline would be indicative of Celtic
service in many of Carthage’s conflicts.
Despite its initial success, the unordered attack let the Romans outflank the disorganized
Celts, who were not fighting in formation. The Romans routed them, and pursued them into the
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city.63 The first battle of the Punic Wars foreshadowed the behavior of most Punic armies and
commanders in the war.
The next battle, outside Agrigentum, saw an improvement in mercenary effectiveness and
unit coordination, though this was still not enough. Hannibal (not Hannibal Barca) commanded
an army of Greek and Celtic mercenaries, as well as 50 new elephants and gave battle to the
Roman and Syracusan army. The army of mercenaries had been together for several months
now, and had learned to fight together as whole. When Hannibal ordered his Numidian cavalry
to harass the Roman frontlines and draw them out of their stockade, the Numidian cavalry did
exactly what they were supposed to do, and lured the Romans out of their siege works. The
Roman cavalry charged forward, only to pursue the retreating light Numidians into a line of
Libyan spearmen. What had previously happened to the Celts in the last battle, when they
attacked boldly but were destroyed, then occurred to the Romans. The whole Carthaginian
division then wheeled around and surrounded the Roman cavalry, killing a great number.64
Despite this success with the cavalry, the mercenary infantry would ultimately not prove
to be a match for the Roman Hastati or Principes. The Roman front-lines caused the
Carthaginian front-lines to withdraw. They retreated back into the elephants which the
Carthaginian commander had mistakenly placed in reserve. This caused great confusion, as now
the elephants had no room to charge, and the formations protecting the elephants made it so that
the men running away could not withdraw. The army quickly began to lose what cohesion it had,
and the retreat turned quickly into a rout.
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At the end of the battle, the Romans found themselves in possession of most of the
elephants, as well as the Carthaginian baggage train.65 The Carthaginians soon withdrew from
the city altogether, choosing to evacuate their mercenaries rather than their remaining elephants,
letting those to fall into Roman hands. The Romans captured and plundered the town.66 These
two instances around Agrigentum show the typical performance of Carthaginian mercenaries in
the First Punic War, showing inexperience or incompetence on the part of the Punic
commanders, and a lack of coordination among the various mercenary bands.
The Battle of Mylae and Its Consequences
While the Carthaginian armies floundered on land, the city-state looked to achieve a
victory at sea. This strategy was made impossible by the Battle of Mylae in 260 BCE. In the
battle, a new Roman navy, employing novel tactics, destroyed an overconfident Carthaginian
fleet. This naval defeat had a decisive impact on how the Carthaginian state would conduct
warfare. With their mastery of the sea contested, the Carthaginians had to rely upon their land
forces to bring about victory. For this, the Carthaginians began to place more and more emphasis
upon their mercenary armies in the First Punic War.
Despite this, innovation was slow to be accepted in the Carthaginian mercenary armies.
Even after Xanthippus’s near miraculous defeat of the Roman invasion of Libya, Carthaginian
mercenary armies were slow to adopt Xanthippus’s methods or adapt in any substantial way.
This is largely to be blamed on the extremely conservative Punic officer corps. After Carthage
was saved by Xanthippus’s brilliance, they immediately returned to the traditional Punic
methods of battle. Hamilcar Barca would show some innovation during his campaigns in Sicily,
but this would not occur until the last few years of the war.
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The Roman Invasion of Africa
After a further depletion of the Carthaginian naval force at the Battle of Ecnomus (in this
battle alone the Carthaginians lost 60 warships) the Roman fleet managed to land a substantial
land army in Libya consisting of 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry in 255 BCE.67 The Libyans did
nothing to oppose the Roman landing, wanting to be free of their Carthaginian overlords, but
they did not actively assist the Roman army either.68
Seeing that the Romans meant to occupy Libya, and then perhaps march on Carthage
itself, the Carthaginians mustered a force of 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry outside Carthage. In
the ensuing battle around the besieged town of Adys, the Carthaginians chose ground poorly
suited to maximize their superiority in cavalry and elephants.69 This mistake illustrates the
unprofessional nature that Punic generals were liable to display, especially those who were not
sent to Sicily to fight but rather relegated to home defense. The rough hilly terrain the
Carthaginians chose for their battle site allowed the Roman heavy infantry to engage the inferior
Carthaginian infantry directly. The Romans took advantage of this and threw their infantry lines
into the Carthaginian’s assembled mercenaries.70 The mercenaries fought surprisingly well in the
ensuing melee, routing the Roman Hastati sent against them. But here to, just as the Celtic
mercenaries showed at Agrigentum, the Carthaginian units were without discipline, and eagerly
pursued the fleeing Romans into the second Roman line. The Carthaginians were soon
outflanked by Roman Principes and Triarii and were destroyed. The Carthaginian cavalry and
elephants retreated in good order, but the infantry was slaughtered.71 Polybius, however, places
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the blame for this, and all the other disasters that took place during the First Punic War not on the
mercenaries themselves but on their commanders.72 Indeed, it would be a change of command,
and the beginning of a new system of mercenary warfare, that would kick the Romans out of
Africa.
Xanthippus
During the winter of 255 BCE, following the disastrous invasion, Carthage reformed its
armies. More regiments were raised, this time from Greece especially.73 The units were recruited
in groups of 50-100, if Diodorus is to be believed.74 In his chapters on Xanthippus, Polybius
makes mention of one of the Carthaginian recruiting agents, “who had for some time been
dispatched to Greece.”75 Unfortunately, this is the only time that the Carthaginian system of
mercenary recruitment is mentioned. It was this agent who saved Carthage from Roman
occupation by recruiting a Spartan general called Xanthippus, whose job it would be to train
mercenaries.76 Polybius does not go into any detail about how this system of recruitment worked,
but it seems likely that it worked in conjunction with the already existing elaborate trade
network.
Xanthippus came to Carthage in 255 BCE to assist the Carthaginians following the
disastrous defeat of the Carthaginians by Regulus. Xanthippus, in a laconic style, told the
Carthaginian magistrates that the reason for their defeat lay with the lack of skill of their
commanders, rather than with any sort of Roman superiority.77 He advised the Carthaginians to
seek flat ground on which to do battle, in order to maximize their cavalry and elephants.
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Amazingly, the Punic officer corps, perhaps recognizing their own inability to defeat the Romans
and the desperate situation they were in, allowed Xanthippus to be placed in command.78 While
Polybius takes obvious pride in recounting the great accomplishments of his fellow Greek (and
perhaps overplays Carthaginian incompetence in order to do so) it is clear that Xanthippus had a
major impact on reorganizing and revitalizing the mercenary armies.79
Xanthippus immediately began drilling the troops and instructing the mercenaries,
conscripts, and Carthaginian citizens (Carthage was obviously in dire straits to conscript its
citizens) in tactics. His professionalism, according to Polybius, contrasted sharply with the
blundering of the Carthaginian generals.80 The drill of Xanthippus trained the army in the use of
disciplined phalanx formations, and likely borrowed from the Spartan training regimen.81 This
intense training boosted the morale of the Carthaginian government, citizenry, and military.
Xanthippus led an army of twelve thousand infantry (a mix of Carthaginian citizen hoplites,
mercenaries of varied background, and conscripted Libyans), two thousand cavalry, and about
one hundred elephants, which met the Roman army in battle.82
The Romans, still inspired by their earlier victories but puzzled at the Carthaginians’
choice of flat ground, determined to fight the newly raised Carthaginian army. It makes sense
that the Romans were enthusiastic, as Xanthippus’s force was the only thing which stood
between the Roman army and Carthage itself. The Carthaginian foot soldiers were animated by
Xanthippus and felt confident in the new tactics and discipline which Xanthippus had instilled in
them. The mercenaries were apparently eager to draw Roman blood. Seeing the confidence of
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their men, the Carthaginian officers placed Xanthippus in absolute command. Xanthippus
deployed his elephants in a line in the very front of the army, with Carthaginian hoplite
phalanxes (heavy, spear-armed infantry) guarding the gaps between the elephants. He divided the
army into three corps, placing one on the right wing, and directing the other two corps, which
Polybius says was full of the “most active” men, with the cavalry on the wings.83
The Roman army, being wary of the elephants, shortened their line of battle, making their
formation “many maniples deep”84 and placing their velites behind their heavier infantry, and
placed their inadequate cavalry on the wings.85 As Xanthippus readied his elephants, the Romans
charged. The Roman cavalry was quickly routed, and the Romans placed in front of the
elephants were trampled to death in short order. The Roman left wing, which could avoid the
elephants, charged the Carthaginian left because, according to Polybius “they thought
contemptuously of the mercenaries” and succeeded in pushing the mercenaries off the field and
back to their entrenchments.86 But this Roman success was only local. With the cavalry on both
wings routed, and the infantry formations disrupted because of the elephants, the Roman army
was quickly encircled and destroyed. Only the Roman general and some 500 men, out of an army
of over fifteen thousand, survived to retreat back to Aspis. The Carthaginian dead numbered a
scant 800, and were mostly those mercenaries stationed on the left who fought the Roman right
flank.87
The leadership of Xanthippus brought the army great victory- the cavalry (which may
have been composed of mercenaries but Polybius is unclear) had played a decisive role, but they
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had outnumbered the Roman cavalry 4 to 1. The elephants were instrumental in sowing chaos
within the Roman infantry formations.88 Despite Xanthippus’s leadership, the mercenaries still
did not quite stand up to a disciplined and eager Roman heavy infantry formation. To make an
infantry force that could stand up to the Roman heavy infantry would require several years’
experience, and constant drilling. Hamilcar Barca was first able to achieve this in Sicily, and
Hannibal Barca would forge a truly excellent, professional army. Even Hannibal’s army,
however, derived its strength primarily from its cavalry and only secondarily from its infantry.
Xanthippus’s brilliant strategy in the whole battle was not trying to make the
mercenaries defeat a Roman legion by fighting better or with more discipline, but by aligning the
diverse elements of his army in such a way so that disadvantage did not ultimately matter. This
showcases not just good generalship, but also a recognition of the strength of a diverse
mercenary system. The Carthaginian commanders must also be given some credit, as they were
able to swallow their pride and then “resigned to Xanthippus the entire direction of affairs, with
full authority to act as he thought most advantageous.”89
Following his victory, Xanthippus immediately and inexplicably left for home. Polybius
attributes this to a danger on Xanthippus’s part from the jealousy his success had caused among
the Carthaginian elite, and praised Xanthippus for his wisdom.90 Whatever the real cause for
Xanthippus’s departure, the Carthaginians were emboldened once again by the victory over
Regulus and by the subsequent though unrelated sinking of a substantial Roman fleet in a storm.
The Carthaginians set out to continue the war in earnest. Deprived of their excellent Spartan
mercenary captain, however, the Carthaginian command would revert to its old tendencies.
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Disaster at Panormous
This reversion to the old style of mercenary warfare is displayed at the battle of
Panormous. Polybius calls it “the strongest town of all the Carthaginian province in Sicily.”91
The Carthaginian army was commanded by a general called Hasdrubal, who had noticed the
recent fear shown by the Romans toward the war elephant and endeavored to force a battle. The
Romans, since the defeat of Regulus, were immensely concerned about the power of
Carthaginian war elephants, and this fear gave Carthage the initiative. Hasdrubal did not employ
his troops skillfully, however, and flung away his great advantage by having his elephants, which
worked best in a set-piece battle on flat terrain, assault the walled city directly. The elephants
were massacred by Roman archers and javelin troops on the city walls. What elephants survived
came crashing back into Hasdrubal’s own formations.92 This victory gave the Romans back their
confidence, especially since it showed that Roman troops that they could defeat an army
containing elephants.
The First Major Mutiny of the War- The Siege of Lilybaeum
Mercenaries were not only sometimes underutilized and poorly coordinated by their
commanders, they were also treacherous. When the Romans besieged the Carthaginian
stronghold of Lilybaeum in Sicily, the Carthaginian commander Himilco relied on the mercenary
garrison to hold the city. There was, however, treason within the Carthaginians walls.
Mercenaries hatched a plot to surrender the city to the Romans, in exchange for their lives and a
handsome payment. The mercenaries met the Roman commander in a secret parley under cover
of dark. In a spot of blind luck, however, a man named Alexion the Achaean, a Greek and a
veteran of Agrigentum who had detected a similar plot there, found out and brought the treason
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to Himilco’s attention. Himilco immediately called a meeting of the remaining mercenary
captains, and by offering them generous payments and favors persuaded them to stay in the army
and not join in the treason. This was a common Carthaginian tactic when dealing with potentially
disloyal mercenaries, and amounted to little more than throwing money at the problem. In effect,
Himilco had to plead with his own troops to stay loyal to him rather than defect, and was forced
to promise what must have been substantial ‘loyalty bonuses’ to his troops.93 Promises like this
would later come back to haunt Carthage in the Mercenary War.
Himilco then had the mercenary captains make speeches in their languages to their men,
urging them not to commit mutiny. Surprisingly, even with the doubtful outcome of victory, and
generous terms given by the Romans, the mercenaries were persuaded not to give up
Lilybaeum.94 When the treasonous mercenary captains came back to the gates, intending to
speak to their men and offer up the city, they were driven away with a hail of arrows and sling
stones. Despite this good outcome, the difficulty (and potential advantage) of dealing with a
multi-lingual army was shown here. On the one hand, Himilco was entirely reliant on the
mercenary captains to relay his terms to their troops, and the whole process was somewhat out of
his control. On the other hand, the mercenary captains could only really communicate to their
own soldiers and the Punic officer corps, and this made total mutiny more difficult.
Battle of Drepana and the Use of Naval Mercenaries
While Himilco barely held onto his mercenary forces in Lilybaeum, other Carthaginian
commanders like Adherbal were able to employ them skillfully, and inspire them. In the Battle
of Drepana, Carthaginian mercenaries fought at sea instead of on land. Despite this highly
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unusual occurrence, the Battle of Drepana illustrates what a mercenary force that is competently
led could accomplish, even before the implementation of the Barcid system.
When the Roman fleet arrived to blockade Drepana, the admiral Adherbal, the overall
Carthaginian commander who coordinated the different Carthaginian armies from his base on the
island, realized that he that he had to fight the Romans at sea to have a hope of winning. This
was troublesome, as he had been given mistaken information that led him to believe the Romans
were not capable of an invasion by sea. He mustered what men and mercenaries happened to be
in the town, and bade them to fight at sea, which they were loath to do out of fear of drowning
and their general unfamiliarity with naval combat.95 Adherabal then gave a rousing speech, and
promised great rewards to those who would follow him out to sea. The mercenaries agreed after
Adherbal told them they mustn’t play the coward, and pointed out the hardship that would result
from blockade.96 Adherbal was one of the few professional generals who knew how to command
his mercenaries, though in this battle his skills would be primarily used for naval warfare, which
was substantially different from the land improvements the mercenary system needed. Indeed,
mercenaries would not be used again for naval warfare, and the whole Battle of Drepana is an
oddity.
Adherbal gave some brief instruction to the mercenaries, including how not to fall off of
the warships, and set sail. The two fleets fought, and were at first evenly engaged. Both navies
using handpicked men as marines, and had skilled rowers and captains on their vessels. The end
result was complete victory for the Carthaginians, in part due to the unexpected zeal of the
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landlubber mercenaries.97 The Romans escaped with a mere thirty vessels, while the
Carthaginians captured ninety-three.98
Hamilcar Barca and the Foundations of the Barcid System
In 246 BCE, Hamilcar Barca, father of the famous Hannibal Barca, makes his first
appearance in Polybius’s narrative, leading Carthaginian ships and mercenaries with the intent of
pillaging the Italian seaboard, which was made possible by the Roman’s abandonment of
maritime warfare. After thoroughly pillaging sections of the Italian coast, (a useless gesture
strategically, but the success of these raids raised the morale of his men immensely) Hamilcar
Barca took his fleet and sailed to Sicily. He did not sail directly to Lilybaeum to relieve the siege,
but instead placed his army in Hercte, between a strong defensive position of Mount Eryx and
the city of Panormous, where Roman supplies had to flow through.99 The Romans were
concerned by this, and sent two large armies to destroy Hamilcar and his troops, but Hamilcar’s
camp was supposedly so naturally fortified that it could not be taken by direct assault. From this
base, Hamilcar was able to launch further raiding parties on the Italian coast.
The Romans set up a camp in the city of Panormous, a short march from Hamilcar’s
camp, but could not assault it. Hamilcar forced the Romans to fight many skirmishes over the
course of three years, and in the words of Polybius, “managed to involve the Romans in many
struggles and dangers.”100 Despite not winning any decisive victories, Hamilcar’s great
endurance in surviving repeated Roman attacks, keeping his army supplied, and still managing to
endanger the Roman supply lines (and tie up great numbers of their soldiers) were much admired
by the Carthaginian government as well as the mercenaries serving under him. Polybius is
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certainly enamored with the general, and considers him the most competent Carthaginian
commander in the First Punic War. While Hamilcar’s image as a brilliant tactician is disputed by
some scholars, including Richard Miles who states he was only a “proficient but not exceptional
tactician,”101 Hamilcar’s mere survival in Sicily is a testament to his and his army’s competence
and tenacity. Hamilcar’s lack of success can be explained not by dismissing his skill as a general,
but rather by considering his extremely limited resources and difficult strategic position. This is a
view that the military historian Adrian Goldsworthy endorses.102
Hamilcar did not remain in his fortified camp too long, however, and Hamilcar led his
men out of his impregnable base and besieged the Roman forces atop Mount Eryx in 244 BCE.
This was a bold move, and could quite easily have ended in disaster for the Carthaginians. The
fact that it did not is testament to Hamilcar Barca’s tenacity, and the skill with which he
employed his mercenary army. Hamilcar was caught between two Roman armies, one atop
Mount Eryx and one based out of the city of Panormous, his supply situation was precarious at
best, with his only connection to the sea being at one point and by one road.103 This siege lasted a
full two years, but the war ended before either side could decisively get the upper hand over the
other.
End of the First Punic War
The war would actually be decided at sea. The Romans, nearly as bankrupted by the war
as the Carthaginians, were able to score a massive victory at the Battle of Aegusa, which crippled
Carthage’s ability to wage war. A peace was quickly arranged, and Hamilcar Barca was put in
charge of negotiating for the Carthaginians. While his position was hopeless, Hamilcar was able
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to get one concession out of the Romans: he demanded that Roman deserters and slaves which
had flocked to his mercenary army were to remain with him, and not be turned over to the
Romans for punishment.104 The army of Sicily was to return to Carthage intact, though all the
other Roman demands, including the total Carthaginian evacuation of Sicily, were agreed to.
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Chapter Six: The Failings of the Pre-Barcid System
Following the peace of the First Punic War, a great rebellion began. The mercenary
veterans, eager to be given the pay they had been promised, attempted to negotiate with a
defeated and bankrupt Carthage. The failings of Carthaginian administrators and defects in the
mercenary system would lead to the outbreak of the Mercenary War. This war is crucial to
understanding the evolution of the mercenary system, as it displays the system’s weak points and
vulnerabilities, and serves as a turning point for the system itself. Following this war, the Barcid
system was established, the system which all subsequent Carthaginian mercenary armies would
follow.
Chaos in Peace
In Carthage, the trade networks were in disarray owing to the loss of all lands in Sicily.
Furthermore, the treasury was empty as a result of paying large war indemnities to the Romans.
This lack of money and greatly reduced revenue ultimately helped cause unrest and rebellion
among the now unemployed mercenaries and oppressed, overtaxed Libyans. In his summary of
the Mercenary War, Polybius speaks against the character of the mercenary troops, calling them
“troops composed of a confused mass of uncivilized tribes”105 and compares them (rather
harshly) to Roman and Greek citizen soldiers who, in his words, “have had the benefit of
education, the habits of social life, and the restraints of law.”106 Polybius is the sole ancient
source for the Mercenary War and his history is, at points, biased and inaccurate.107 Polybius is
disdainful of the mercenary troops about which he writes, and his work is ultimately geared
toward explaining Roman dominance, not treating the Carthaginians or their mercenaries fairly.
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With the Carthaginians, Polybius shows their dealings with the mercenaries as incompetent, at
least before Hamilcar arrives. Afterward, the focus of the account is on Hamilcar. Despite this,
Polybius’s concise narrative is not one-sided. Poor treatment of the Libyans and the bungling
Carthaginian administration is reported, as is Hamilcar’s ruthlessness when dealing with the
mutineers. The sources Polybius uses to inform his narrative are unknown, though it is quite
possible that he had access to Greek memoirs from the war, as well as works from other Greek
historians, who themselves had access to Punic records.108
While Hamilcar Barca’s and the Carthaginian Council’s surrender would seem to be
militarily and financially advantageous, as it ended a war which could have destroyed Carthage,
it actually placed the city in greater danger. Had Hamilcar’s army in Sicily been destroyed in
battle, Carthage’s financial obligation toward its mercenaries would have been dissolved.
Instead, the large army of mercenaries was intact, had to be evacuated from Sicily in order to
abide by the terms of the peace treaty, and the mercenaries were demanding to be paid. Carthage
faced the very real threat of mutiny, rebellion and, if the force which gathered around Carthage
was large enough, destruction.109
The Mercenary War helps to highlight all of the drawbacks to relying on a mercenary
army. The disaster was caused, most obviously, by a lack of money with which to pay the troops.
Other factors contributed, however. For a period of several months the mercenary armies were
allowed to become idle and unemployed in an area not far from Carthage itself. This gave time
and opportunity for powerful and ambitious mercenary captains to scheme and organize a
mutiny. These disloyal mercenary captains were especially dangerous and were what made the
Mercenary War so long and needlessly bloody. The lack of money, idle, unpaid troops, and
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ambitious violent leaders all contributed to creating a recipe for disaster. This was compounded
by a lack of skilled Carthaginian response to the disaster, which could have avoided open
conflict. Good leadership, however, would not arrive until after Hamilcar Barca took up arms
against the rebellious mercenaries.
Polybius recognizes the lessons to be learned from this war, and says “it most
conspicuously shows those who employ mercenaries what dangers they should foresee and
provide against.”110 The Carthaginians, or at least the Barcas, would learn the lessons taught by
the disaster of the Mercenary War and reform what had been a merely adequate system for
recruiting and training soldiers and armies into a superb military machine, whose mercenary
captains were tightly controlled by a Punic officer corps.111
The Mercenary War, 241-237 BCE
The Mercenary War was made possible by the adoption of a rather naive plan by the
Carthaginian magistrates, whose strategy for paying the mercenaries ran counter to Hamilcar’s
own. Hamilcar, after the conclusion of the First Punic War, moved his army to the port of
Lilybaeum to evacuate them from the island, as he was required to do by the terms of the peace
treaty. Hamilcar intended to ship back his mercenary units one at a time to Carthage to receive
payment. After receiving payment, the mercenary unit would be sent back to its native country
before the next arrived. This way would buy time for the Carthaginian state to raise the money
with which to pay the mercenaries, while also ensuring no large amount of impatient mercenaries
could amass near the capitol.112 This plan required the mercenaries to be paid in full, however,
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and included the ludicrously large bonuses that had been promised to the mercenaries in order to
buy their loyalty in Sicily.113
The magistrates and aristocrats back at Carthage, who themselves had little direct
experience with mercenaries, were ever mindful of the empty treasury and devised a different
plan. Rather than send the mercenary units back to their homeland once they arrived, instead
they planned to keep them in Carthage until a large amount of mercenaries had gathered,
believing that then the mercenaries would accept lower payment than what they had been
promised. The idea appears to have been to gather all the mercenary units together in order to
show them how, as such a large group, they were incredibly expensive and how therefore they
had little hope of being paid what was owed in full. It is also likely that the Carthaginian
bureaucracy intended to play one contingent off against another, and get one faction to challenge
debt owed by the other in order to increase their own.114 As Gesco, Hamilcar’s second-incommand, ferried contingents carefully, one at a time to Carthage, his careful work was
undermined by the hardheadedness of the Carthaginian aristocracy.115
Carthaginian leaders are not as thoughtless as they might first appear for believing that
well-armed mercenaries would stay manageable and compliant in the face of a lack of pay.
Hamilcar’s army in Sicily had already been without a steady wage for months if not years, and
the mercenaries were at first quite reasonable, willing to wait several months for payment before
they became insistent.116 Even the patience of professionals, however, has its limits.
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As the mercenary population in the Carthaginian capitol became larger and larger,
discipline among the soldiers relaxed to the point of non-existence, and there was, in the words
of Polybius, “the commission of many acts of lawlessness by night and day.”117 Terrified for the
safety of its Punic citizens, and practically unable to police the large body of military guests,
Carthage then sent a request to all the mercenary captains, asking for them to retire away from
Carthage to a nearby town, Sicca.118 The mercenaries retreated there, but this to would prove to
be a mistake on the hands of the Carthaginian council. Once there, the mercenaries found they
were still unemployed and unpaid, but also now unsupervised by the Punic government.
According to Polybius, who consistently takes a dim view of the mercenaries’ characters, they
spent their time calculating the amount of money due them, inflating this number with each
count. What professional discipline the mercenaries had maintained while quartered in Carthage
collapsed. Some resorted to debauchery, while others began plotting and planning.119 In addition
to their pay, the mercenaries asked for payment for lost horses, damaged weapons and armor,
and other expenses accrued on campaign. While Polybius does not give a number on the amount
of debt owed, Hoyos very roughly estimates the amount at 16 million drachmas, more than the
entire gross income for Carthage for the year.120
Language Barrier
The multiethnic force of mercenaries which gathered at Sicca did not speak the same
languages, and only relatively few understood Punic to any significant degree. While men from
different national divisions could not speak to each other, however, conversations within camps
between men of the same units was very common. This made negotiation difficult and
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compounded Carthaginian efforts to negotiate. At the beginning of the conflict, most mercenaries
seemed willing to negotiate, but the gap in language caused divisions and distrust among the
mercenaries and the Carthaginians. Hanno, the Carthaginian negotiator, began the talks at Sicca
by announcing that Carthage was too poor to pay the mercenaries, and that he hoped the
mercenaries would accept a reduction in pay. The mercenaries saw this underhanded move,
which unified them in their demands. Hanno was unable to address the men as a group during his
subsequent negotiations, instead having to work through the mercenary captains who likely
spoke Punic.121 Since addressing all the various national groups of the army at once was
impractical, Hanno attempted to pay off the different ethnicities in the army individually, and
held separate negotiations with all of them. It is interesting and a bit perplexing that Carthaginian
commanders could coordinate multilingual armies on the battlefield, but not deal with them at
the negotiating table. Likely, most mercenaries knew Punic military and drill terminology, but
lacked the vocabulary to engage in detailed negotiation. While Hanno’s strategies may have
seemed a practical solution, they gave the Carthaginians an aura of duplicity.
The multiethnic composition of the mercenary army, according to Polybius, was an
intentional design on the part of the Carthaginians, as it ensured that the men, being separated by
ethnic and linguistic barriers, could not quickly come together to foment mutiny.122 Celts from
Liguria, Balearic Islanders, Greeks (whom Polybius, aghast at seeing Greeks portrayed as
untrustworthy greedy thugs, assures readers were merely “half-bred Greeks, mostly deserters and
slaves”123), a huge contingent of Libyans, and other nationalities as well gathered in the camp,
angry and frustrated with the apparently underhanded and miserly Hanno. The linguistic and
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cultural barriers on this occasion did not help to prevent mutinous ideas, but rather prevented
Hanno from being able to quickly reason with and calm the various bands of mercenaries.124 In
addition to this, none of the Punic officers they had served under in Sicily had been sent to
negotiate with them. Hamilcar had avoided negotiating with the mercenaries, likely to distance
himself from the political fallout of the lost war.125 In anger, some of the mercenaries decided to
move against the Carthaginians in a show of force, to show they would not accept a decrease in
pay, and encamped their army of over 20,000 men outside the town of Tunis, not at all far from
Carthage itself.126
The Carthaginians panicked at this bold move, as they had already released the families
of the mercenaries, who had been made hostage on the mercenaries’ recruitment, back to them,
rather than holding them as was convention.127 Blaming Hamilcar for the current disaster, as he
did not come to negotiate with the mercenaries, the Carthaginians instead tasked other officers
who had served with the mercenaries in Sicily with arbitrating the dispute. But the confidence of
the mercenaries had grown greatly after seeing the Carthaginian distress and they demanded an
astronomically high payment. Talks broke down.128 As time went on, the mercenaries became
less certain that they would ever be paid, and malcontents within the army grew more and more
popular. The idle, now unemployed army had little to do other than sharpen their weapons and
listen to what the more extreme members of their force were saying. At the march to and from
Sicca, the mercenary army would have become informed of the Libyan unrest, and would have
seen it as yet another piece of leverage (or instrument of rebellion) against their employers.129
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Carthage sent forth envoy after envoy to negotiate with mercenaries, and eventually an
agreement was reached between the now greedy mercenaries and the frightened Carthaginians.
But the war would then spark for unrelated reasons: not directly over the cause of pay (though
non-payment brought the situation to a head).130 The malcontents in the army, led by Mathos and
Spendius, would spark outright mutiny for reasons of their own, and be able to convince their
less rebellious comrades to follow suit.
Mathos and Spendius
Gesco, who prior to this had still been ferrying yet more troops from Sicily to Africa,
then arrived with a large amount of cash to distribute some of the pay. But by this point a large
part of the mercenaries was beyond placation by what coin Carthage had available, seeing the
possible great advantages to be gained from attacking a weakened Carthage. Carthage had only a
small body of citizens to protect the city, and did not have the time to raise another force to
oppose the mercenaries.
Fueling the malcontents in the army was the fact that some of the mercenaries did not
want the army to be discharged and forced to return home. Two mercenaries became the
spokespeople for this group, Mathos and Spendius. Spendius was a Roman slave who had joined
the army in Sicily, part of the group that Hamilcar had ensured escaped immediate Roman justice
in the peace treaty. Spendius feared that the mercenary army would disband, and that then his
former owner would be free to collect him and punish him.131 The traditional punishment for this
was torture followed by crucifixion. The only way to avoid the army disbanding was to keep it
fighting, even if that meant fighting the Carthaginians over the pretext of lost pay. The other
mercenary captain devoted toward mutiny was a man called Mathos, who was a Libyan. He had
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apparently frequently spoken against the Carthaginians, calling them oppressors and attempting
to convince his fellow mercenaries and Libyans to not accept any pay from Carthage. Mathos
feared that if the mercenary army were to disband, then Carthage would take the opportunity to
exact revenge on him (and perhaps his people) for his past deeds.132
Motivated by these fears, and by a desire to perhaps take over Carthage itself, these two
led the mercenaries in outright rebellion. Mathos convinced a large part of the Libyan conscripts,
which made up the plurality of the army, to join in rebellion. Polybius records that Mathos
“suggested to them [the Libyans] that, when the men of other races had received their pay, and
taken their departure to their several countries, the Carthaginians would wreak upon them the full
weight of the resentment which they had … incurred.”133 The mercenaries and the Libyans were
easily roused to anger and a few to outright mutiny. Other mercenary captains, such as Autoritas
the Gaul, leader of the mercenary Celts, mentioned later in Polybius’s narrative, must also have
been coconspirators in the plot.
The linguistic barrier posed an impediment to organizing a rebellion, however. The
process for spreading dissatisfaction among the mercenaries was slow, but the main body of the
army consisted of Libyans, who were easily excited by Mathos’s demagoguery.134 As the
mutineers began to move, those in the army who expressed a differing opinion or moved to stop
the arrest of Gesco and his staff were promptly killed. The army all knew the Punic word for
throw, likely taught to them during military exercises under Carthaginian commanders, and when
the mutinous mercenary captains cried “throw”, a hail of stones descended on the unfortunate
victims. The army was purged, as it would have to be several times by Mathos and Spendius, and
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the mutiny moved forward. Proper war with Carthage commenced, a war whose aim was to
muddled and legitimacy murky, inspired by fear and greed. Gesco had made little attempt to stop
the mutiny, nor does he appear to have even been on guard against mutiny. Had Gesco been
operating under the tene

nts of the Barcid system, the revolt would not have taken place, but

he was not (it hadn’t been fully formed yet) and it did. Had Gesco, along with the other
Carthaginian magistrates, been using the Barcid system, they would not have failed to pay the
troops, let alone attempt negotiate drastic pay cuts. This shook the confidence and loyalty of the
mercenaries. The Barcid system recognized that a mercenary army’s loyalty should ultimately be
to the commander, rather than to the mercenary captains. The army of Xanthippus, Hamilcar
Barca’s army in Iberia, and Hannibal Barca’s army in Iberia all display this trait. In the
Mercenary War, Gesco and the other Carthaginians took little to no steps to curb the
independence of mercenary captains. Additionally, Hamilcar was not recalled to deal with the
mercenaries, and this represents the failure of the Carthaginians to make use of any residual
loyalty the soldiers felt for their commander, the man they had served under for the better part of
a decade. Had the principles of the Barcid system (ensuring loyalty of troops through payment,
personal loyalty to a charismatic commander, and crushing any allegiance to middlemen
mercenary captains) been obeyed, the troops paid, and most importantly the power of the
mercenary captains curtailed, the revolt either would not have occurred, or would at least have
been far less likely.
The Libyans Join the Revolt
While Mathos and Spendius affected their coup, Mathos also sent word to all the cities of
Libya, urging them to revolt against Carthaginian dominion and seek their freedom. This
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succeeded.135 Nearly all the cities in Libya joined the revolt, providing supplies, reinforcements,
and bases of operation.136 Mathos was joined by as many as 70,000 Libyans.137
In response to these revolts, Hanno began recruitment of a second army of mercenaries to
fight the first one. He also began drilling Carthaginian citizens of military age, as well as
outfitting cavalry.138 The one great advantage that the Carthaginians had over the mercenaries
were their elephants, as the mutineers had none. Hanno had with him about 100 elephants and
went to relieve the besieged city of Utica, one of the first targets of the mutineers. Once again,
however, the Carthaginians failed to use their elephants in the proper terrain and nearly brought
disaster to the whole army and to the Uticans themselves. The mercenaries, having been trained
in Sicily under Hamilcar, retreated from the elephants to a nearby hill, which was naturally
fortified and forested. Hanno, thinking he had won the battle with the first elephant charge,
retired for the day. But the mercenaries came down from the hill and attacked Hanno’s army
while it was out of position and formation, and put it to rout. As the campaign wore on, the
mutinous mercenaries showed cunning and resolve, while Hanno displayed the opposite.139
Hamilcar Takes Command
After this defeat, the Carthaginians recalled Hamilcar Barca and placed him in overall
command. His army, despite the losses Hanno had forced on it, amounted to 10,000 infantry,
mixed with newly-hired mercenaries and Carthaginian citizens, as well as a modest cavalry force
and seventy remaining elephants.140 Hamilcar quickly raised the siege of Utica in a surprise
attack, having marched undetected under cover of darkness. The result reinvigorated
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Carthaginian morale, while causing the morale of the Libyans and the mercenaries to
plummet.141 Spendius and his forces were defeated, with no less than 6,000 of his forces being
killed, while his Libyan allies retreated home to their various towns and cities. 2,000 of the
enemy were captured by Hamilcar. The captured soldiers were treated well, being released from
captivity on condition that they never again take up arms against Carthage.
Following this defeat, Mathos sent couriers to the Libyans and the Numidians, urging
them to bring aid. The Numidians responded, bringing a large army. The Libyans also came and
marched to the assistance of Mathos. It was in this way the Hamilcar found himself outflanked,
with a Numidian camp facing him in one direction, a Libyan one in another, and Mathos’s army
in his front. Escape seemed impossible, or so Polybius relates.142
Naravas’s Arrival
It was at this point that an almost miraculous event occurred, one which arguably saved
Carthage from destruction, much as Xanthippus’s arrival had saved Carthage in the First Punic
War. A Numidian defector named Naravas, who claimed that he had great affection for the
Carthaginians, rode into Hamilcar’s camp and announced that he wished to meet Hamilcar.
Naravas’s request for an audience was granted. Naravas pledged 2,000 horsemen to Hamilcar’s
aid, in return for the right to marry Hamilcar’s daughter. Still incredulous, Hamilcar readily
agreed.143
With his army thus reinforced, Hamilcar gave battle to Spendius, Autaritus, and Mathos.
In the ensuing battle, Hamilcar’s elephants and especially his new Numidian auxiliaries, proved
decisive. The mutinous mercenaries suffered no less than 10,000 casualties, with another 4,000
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men being taken prisoner. Those taken prisoner were offered the chance to join the army, those
who refused were released, on pain of death if they were ever found raising arms against
Carthage again.144
Spendius and Mathos Change Their Strategy
This clemency toward captured mutineers worried Spendius and Mathos. They worried
that Hamilcar’s conciliatory treatment might induce their men to defect or lose heart, thinking
surrender a better deal than continued fighting. To prevent this, Spendius and Mathos killed the
captive Gesco and declared that any captured Carthaginians would be put to death.145
The Carthaginians reacted to this with horror. The mutineers also began to carry out
indiscriminate massacring of Carthaginian citizens, murdering many. Now, both Hamilcar and
the mercenaries were convinced that the only path to ending the war was the complete
annihilation of the other side.146 No further quarter would be given.
The Battle of the Saw
Spendius and the other mercenary captains next sought a parley with Hamilcar. Seeing
their captains taken by the Carthaginians, however, the Libyans and mercenaries quickly
attacked in a disorganized and emotional fashion. Again, communication and organization were
always difficult for the mutineers, even more so than it would have been for the army under
Carthaginian command, whose command structure was formal and established. The mercenaries
may have acted in an emotional and violent reaction, or a section of the army may have plotted
to use the parley as a surprise attack.
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In any case, when he saw the mutineers rushing his camp, Hamilcar unleashed his
elephants, and killed a great number in what Polybius records as the Battle of the Saw. The
elephants, with support for Naravas’s cavalry and the Carthaginian infantry, made short work of
the disorganized mob. 40,000 of the enemy were supposedly slain by Hamilcar’s army that day,
and Spendius was captured.147
In the next battle, Mathos was taken prisoner, and all the remaining Libyans submitted to
Carthage.148 The war had gone on for over three years, ravaged the North African countryside,
and killed tens of thousands. Mathos was paraded through Carthage before being tortured and
killed. The Romans took advantage of Carthage’s weakness to seize the island of Sardinia.149
The utterly unjustified seizure of Sardinia would later be listed by Polybius as an underlying
cause for the Second Punic War, as it instilled in Hamilcar an undying hatred of Rome which
was transferred to his son. The name of Hamilcar was now synonymous among the
Carthaginians with hero, and he enjoyed much admiration and respect from citizens and Senate
alike.
The Barcid System
During the Mercenary War, Hamilcar had raised a second force of mercenaries to defeat
the original one he had commanded in Sicily. It was not only the second batch of mercenaries
which granted Hamilcar victory, as a great superiority in elephants and cavalry helped greatly,
Hamilcar’s use of his troops during the war and subsequently in Iberia would form the basis of
the Barcid system. Inspired by Xanthippus, who Hamilcar may even have met at the age of
twenty as a young officer, and taught the cruel lessons of the Mercenary War which Hamilcar
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waged himself, Hamilcar’s new army would march and conquer Spain. Hamilcar took steps to
avoid repeating the disaster of the mercenary war.
First, he made sure that his troops were paid regularly and consistently, or at least
regularly enough so as to avoid discontent.150 Pay for mercenaries in the ancient world was
divided into two types, a standard pay and a payment for rations, termed opsonion and
sitometria. Payment of the sitometria, or ration pay, was essential for the average soldier to
obtain food and supplies. This payment had to be ensured. Payment of the opsonion, or pay in
addition to rations, was essential to ensure the mercenaries’ loyalty, though this could be
deferred for some period of time, and it was considered normal for commanders to occasionally
defer payment.151 By guaranteeing that these delays were kept to a minimum (this was achieved
by capturing lucrative Spanish silver mines, as well as continuous campaigning for loot)
disagreements and discontent over pay were minimized. Second, the independence of mercenary
captains was greatly reduced: the command of mercenary units, and even allied levies, would
now be strictly supervised by a Punic officer corps. After the mercenary war, Punic officers are
recorded as being in command and control of mercenary companies, rather than officers of the
same nationalities as the mercenaries. Thirdly, attempts were made to instill a sense of personal
and familial loyalty in the mercenaries, with Hamilcar treating the army less as a mere
instrument of Carthage and more as a Barcid army. Allied or subjugated Iberian tribes were
encouraged toward loyalty to the Barca family, rather than the Carthaginian state.152 Hamilcar
brought his family members from Carthage to Spain, and had them train with and command the
army. Among those taken was Hannibal Barca, at the age of nine, a boy who would go on to
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spend most of his life with this same army. While other methods of control, like marriage
alliances with local tribes and the taking of hostages continued to be used, they were not relied
upon as the primary means of ensuring loyalty.
Merging these attempts at ensuring the loyalty and control over mercenaries with the
strict and disciplined training methods learned through Xanthippus, the Barcid system took form.
Troops were drilled to fight in formation and to fight alongside and in concert with other
mercenary contingents. Part of this evolved naturally, as the various mercenary companies
fought side by side in battle over the course of years, facing the hardship of military campaigns
together. Drill and discipline, however, were also essential to achieving efficient and effective
unit coordination, as would be displayed in Iberia and especially in Italy. The army in Iberia
developed strict training and discipline, and fought together as a cohesive force, one whose
multiethnic components supported each other without problems on the battlefield.153
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Chapter Seven: The Barcid System Solidifies in Spain
Campaign in Spain 237-228 BCE
Despite much of Hamilcar’s Iberian campaigns being unrecorded, these series of wars are
most important for seeing the transformation of the Carthaginian mercenary army. While in
Spain, Hamilcar recruited local Iberians (paid for by captured Spanish silver) and campaigned
with the army constantly, so that the mercenaries were never without employment or pay, and
the length of campaign gave Punic officers like Hasdrubal the Fair, Hannibal, and others
acquaintance with the mercenary captains, which drastically decreased the risk of rebellion.
Again, because the army was in constant campaign (indeed this is the same army Hannibal Barca
would famously lead over the Alps 30 years later) the multiethnic units within it became
extremely experienced and accustomed to fighting together.
In 238 BCE, Hamilcar Barca was sent along with an army, variously composed of
Africans and mercenaries to Iberia in order to expand Carthaginian holdings in the peninsula. He
campaigned for nine years in Iberia, winning the entire southern coast and subjugating many of
the native tribes.154 Hamilcar had shown his tendency toward innovation and battlefield
competence in Sicily during the First Punic War and in Africa during the Mercenary War. As
losses were inflicted on the army in its Iberian conquests, new troops were hired from Iberia as
well as hired abroad. The loot acquired from the campaign was used to augment the Barcid
prestige, and much was sent home to Carthage itself, to bolster the state as well as secure
political power back home.155
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Hamilcar was killed in a battle against a tribe called the Oretani in 229 BCE after being
betrayed, not by his mercenaries, but rather by his Iberian allies. His son-in-law, Hasdrubal the
Fair, took over the campaign to secure Iberia for Carthage.156 Hasdrubal took a much more
diplomatic approach to subjugating the Iberians, securing control of a swath of Iberian territory
by marrying a princess from another powerful tribe. While Hamilcar’s campaigns secured Iberia
for Carthage, Hasdrubal’s efforts consolidated it. This is not to imply, however, that Hasdrubal
was not willing to use force to accomplish his goals. While in control of Iberia, he increased the
size of the army he inherited from Hamilcar to 60,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and over 200
elephants.157 Hasdrubal also founded the city of New Carthage, or Carthago Nova, as the seat of
Carthaginian power in the peninsula. The city, which is modern-day Cartagena, had 10,000 male
inhabitants by the time of the Second Punic War and would serve as a crucial base of operations
for the later war effort against Rome.158 Hasdrubal died in 221 BCE, killed by a Celtic assassin
over a private disagreement.159 Control of the army, which had been on campaign in Iberia since
Hamilcar’s first invasion, passed to Hannibal Barca.
Hannibal Barca in Spain
Hannibal had been taken to Iberia at the age on nine by his father, and had been educated
on military matters both through instruction (Hamilcar hired Greek tutors to educate his son) and
by witnessing the Iberian campaigns firsthand. As soon as Hannibal gained command of the
army, he wrote to the Carthaginian senate for instructions and began preparing for a war with
Rome. Hannibal pursued an aggressive policy in Iberia, further increasing the size of Carthage’s
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holdings. In addition to Iberian silver mines, Iberia was a great source of military manpower for
Carthage. Carthaginian recruiting agents had long used Celtiberian soldiers in their armies.
Drawing from the large supply of manpower in Iberia, including incorporating and integrating
captured Iberian tribesmen to join the Carthaginian side, the Barcas managed to raise an army
capable of subduing Iberia and taking on Rome. The first step toward that goal was the conquest
of Saguntum, a town in Iberia allied with the Romans. In order to spark the inevitable war with
Rome, Hannibal moved his army to siege the city, which the Romans did not hasten to defend, as
they were engaged with other enemies, such as the Celtic tribes of Cisalpine Gaul.
Hannibal quickly seized Saguntum, one of the richest towns left in Iberia that was not
under the sway of Carthage, and distributed the loot amongst his soldiers. Due to the loss of the
majority of Carthage’s fleet in the First Punic War, which had not been rebuilt, the invasion
would have to take place overland. He sent messengers to the many tribes, both Celtiberian and
Gallic, who were on his invasion route, asking them to either join him in his war or at least not
oppose his march. Due to Rome’s recent bellicosity toward its northern Gallic neighbors and
colonization of land in the Po river valley, Hannibal’s messengers got a warm reception.
The Uniqueness of Hannibal’s Army and the Barcid System
The army which endured the long march through potentially hostile territory and across
inhospitable terrain was the most successful Carthaginian mercenary army in history, but this
excellence is sometimes portrayed in accounts, even by the ancient sources, as a product of
Hannibal’s genius solely. The success of the army was as much a product of a Barcid military
system, which predated Hannibal, as it was of Hannibal’s tactical skill. Without an obedient,
competent force, none of Hannibal’s battle plans could have been properly executed.
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The reason that Hannibal’s army was so professional, disciplined, and loyal was not only
because of the Barcid military system, but also because the army as a whole had been in
continuous existence for twenty years. In that time it had accumulated a vast amount of
experience. Its units knew their Punic officers and captains well, and knew how to fight
alongside the other multiethnic forces. This experience and unit coordination, shown on multiple
occasions in the accounts of the battles of Lake Trasimine, Trebia, and Cannae, could only have
been instilled in army whose soldiers had been on campaign and fought together. To quote
Dexter Hoyos: “Long service, shared dangers, campfire tales and traditions, and knowing how
important they were to their employer gave mercenary troops a strong espirit de corps.”160 Once
the core of the army veterans was formed, it was relatively easy to incorporate new units
recruited from Po valley tribes or defecting Roman allies into the overall framework of the army,
but without this core of veterans the army would not have the professional discipline, or loyalty
to Hannibal, that allowed it to defeat the Roman army. Without this veteran core of soldiers,
Hannibal’s army would have more resembled the lackluster, semi-professional sell-swords who
failed to defeat Rome in the First Punic War and failed disastrously at defeating the Syracusans
in the Sicilian Wars. The fact that this army had accumulated so much experience and had
learned to fight cohesively made it extremely precious as it was the only one of its caliber the
Carthaginians possessed and once lost it would be nearly impossible to rebuild. This army was
unique, but it was not a historical anomaly, but rather a product of the Barcid system.
Despite the fact that if lost this army could not be replaced, Hannibal led it into the heart
of the enemy’s territory over some of the most inhospitable terrain in Europe and inflicted
decisive defeats on the Roman army in brilliantly planned battles. It is true that without the
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army’s professional discipline and loyalty Hannibal could not have used it effectively, but it is
also true that without Hannibal’s tactical brilliance and daring the army could not have achieved
what it did.
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Chapter Eight: Hannibal and the Epitome of the Barcid System
In the campaign over the Alps and into Italy, Hannibal would display in a series of
decisive victories the merits of the Barcid system. Loyalty, unit coordination, and discipline
merged together to help the army become an extension of Hannibal’s will.
Second Punic War 218-201 BCE- The March Into Italy
In 218 BCE Hannibal marched out of New Carthage in late Spring with a huge army. It
was essential that his army go over the Alps within the year, and he fought with speed across
Iberia from the Ebro River to the Pyrenees, taking towns by assault. The region was not yet
conquered, however, and Hannibal left of force of 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to garrison
the territory. Leaving his heavy baggage with this force, Hannibal took his remaining men and
elephants and crossed the Pyrenees into Gaul. The great size of the army had been essential for
pacifying North-Eastern Iberia, but created an impediment to speed. 10,000 of new Celtiberian
recruits, likely not yet were released from service to return home, leaving Hannibal with a huge
but more manageable and experienced force of 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry.161 Crossing
into Gaul, his army suffered desertion and stragglers, but these mostly came from inexperienced
new recruits, not motivated enough to march the long distances Hannibal required of them.
The mercenary army’s next challenge was getting over the Alps themselves, and going
through the territory of the mountain tribes that lived there. The mountainous terrain was
difficult, consisting of narrow passes. One Celtic tribe called the Allobroges attempted to halt
Hannibal’s advance over their mountain territory, seeking to deter the invaders and acquire loot
from the army. The mercenaries scouted the positions of the enemy, however, and attacked them
at night. Capturing the settlement of the Allobroges, Hannibal’s army acquired enough food it

161

Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Fall of Carthage. 158-159.

66

feed itself for several days. While through Hannibal’s march there were occasional raids
targeting the army’s baggage train, the Gallic tribesmen were not accustomed to seeing elephants
and the animal’s presence deterred the raiders.162 Hannibal quickly traversed the Alps, in a mere
two weeks according to Polybius.163
In crossing the Alps, however, the endurance and devotion of his mercenaries was pushed
to a limit. Hannibal lost a good deal of fighting men, his army being reduced in size by nearly
half. His infantry force went from being 40,000 to 20,000 and his cavalry was reduced to 6,000
from an original force of 9,000.164 Most of his losses were not battlefield casualties, but rather
troops who straggled, dropped out of the march, deserted, or died from disease and exposure.
Most of the attrition inflicted on Hannibal’s army, however, was among the newer Celtiberian
recruits who followed the army over, while the tougher and more experienced African levies and
other mercenaries remained. Still, some 40 percent of the army was Iberian in origin. 165 The
territory Hannibal was marching into was the Celtic inhabited area of Cisalpine Gaul, where a
hotbed of anti-Roman feeling created a vast new recruiting ground. While incorporating the
undisciplined Po River valley Gauls into the army would prove difficult, Hannibal had plenty of
time to campaign in Italy, an experienced existing core of veterans around which to incorporate
the new Gallic recruits, and the ability to force integration through experience on the battlefield.
Some tribes still needed to be persuaded though, and when the Taurini tribe refused to provide
Hannibal with supplies (as they were too busy fighting their neighbors the Insubres) Hannibal
stormed the main settlement of the Taurini, massacred the inhabitants, and took their supplies of
food for his army.
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Most of the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul, however, provided the mercenary army with the
needed supplies and reinforcements necessary to take on the Romans, and Hannibal’s army was
nearly entirely dependent on this Celtic aid, as the men, horses, elephants, and officers were
exhausted from the march over the Alps, and incapable of fighting the Romans without rest and
resupply.166 With this achieved, the army was ready to bring the fight to Rome.
Strategy in Italy
Hannibal’s long term strategy to win the war in Italy is not as straight forward as it might
seem. His army never made an attempt to take the city of Rome itself, and, despite destroying
Roman army after Roman army in decisive battle, a strategy for ending the war does not seem
apparent from an analysis of Hannibal’s movements. For years after his greatest victory at
Cannae, his army plundered the Italian countryside virtually uncontested, and the war dragged on
without a brokered peace.
Hannibal’s strategy (or one aspect of his plan) becomes clear, however, when the nature
of the Roman military and state is considered. Despite having an ethnically homogenous army,
Rome relied on Latin allies to provide soldiers and war material, as well as bases of operation.
Just as Carthage relied militarily on mercenaries and the levies provided by subject peoples, the
Romans relied militarily on a web of subordinate allies. Without these allies, the power of Rome
would have been limited to just the city itself and surrounding land. By winning battles and
plundering the Italian countryside unopposed, Hannibal hoped to convince Rome’s allies, both at
home and abroad, of Roman weakness and Punic strength. Through a show of force, and the
promise of loot on the one hand and the threat of destruction on the other, Hannibal hoped to
cause Rome’s allies to defect. Hannibal employed a number of methods to entice these powers to
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his side. He promised glory and loot to be had from those who joined him in his war with Rome,
demonstrated military superiority in pitched battle, and threatened those who stayed loyal to
Rome through aggressive and ruthless military actions. In this, Hannibal was largely successful,
causing the defection of nearly all the Celtic tribes to the north of Rome, as well as that of key
allied Italian cities like Capua.167 Perhaps taking inspiration from the successes and failures of
King Pyrrhus’s own invasion of Italy, which attempted but failed to cause the Italian allies to
defect, Hannibal sought to isolate Rome diplomatically and militarily.168
In addition to convincing Roman allies to defect, Hannibal had to convince his own
soldiers to stay loyal. Aiding Hannibal in this task was his charismatic affinity for oratory.
Polybius records a speech Hannibal made to his weary army, whose morale was dangerously
low, that shows Hannibal’s brilliant charisma. After capturing some hostages from a hostile tribe
in Cisalpine Gaul, Hannibal lined his men up to view them. He gathered captured horses and
expensive armor into the middle of his cluster of men, and placed the prisoners there also. He
then offered the prisoners the chance to win both some of the loot and their freedom, if they
could defeat one of the other prisoners in a duel. The prisoners are described by Polybius as
“loaded with heavy chains, half-starved, and their bodies a mass of bruises from scourging.”169
In this desperate state, Hannibal told them that it did not matter when they won or lost the duel,
as either way they would find release. Reportedly, all the prisoners took Hannibal up on his
offer, and fought each other to the death.170
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After the first fight, Hannibal addressed his men, though his words needed no translation.
He claimed that he had exhibited these prisoners to his men to show them their own condition.
Hannibal said
“Fortune had summoned them to a life and death contest very like that of the two captives,
and in which the prize of victory was the same. For they must either conquer, or die, or fall
alive into the hands of their enemies; and the prize of victory would not be mere horses and
military cloaks, but the most enviable position in the world if they became masters of the
wealth of Rome: or if they fell in battle their reward would be to end their life fighting to
their last breath. … If they reasoned and resolved thus, victory and safety would certainly
attend them: for it never happened that men who came to such a resolution, whether of
deliberate purpose or from being driven to bay, were disappointed in their hope of beating
their opponents in the field. And when it chanced, as was the case with the Romans, that the
enemy had in most cases a hope of quite an opposite character, from the near neighborhood
of their native country making flight an obvious means of safety, then it was clear that the
courage which came of despair would carry the day.”171
Through this demonstration, which transcended both the linguistic and cultural barriers in his
army, Hannibal conveyed his message and cemented his army’s allegiance (even the new Celtic
recruits) even in the face of weariness and utmost desperation. This unshakeable loyalty and
restored morale would be used against the Roman armies fast approaching to respond to
Hannibal’s invasion.
As his campaign moved through the Italian countryside and brought Hannibal into direct
contact with Rome’s Latin and Italian allies, Hannibal was also careful to treat the Roman allies
with the utmost politeness and friendship. Captured Italian allies were sometimes set free without
ransom, and Hannibal attempted to entice the allied cities of Italy to defect to his side. Hannibal,
however, did not primarily entice the Italian allies with promises of loot as he had the Celts, but
instead appealed to their sense of patriotism and freedom. Hannibal is quoted as saying in one
important meeting with a delegation of Roman allies
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“that he had not come to fight against them, but against Rome in their behalf; and
that, therefore, if they were wise, they would attach themselves to him: because he had
come to restore freedom to the Italians, and to assist them to recover their cities and
territory which they had severally lost to Rome."172
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Chapter Nine: Proving the Barcid System- Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae
Hannibal would prove the value of his words through force of arms on the battlefield.
The Celts who flocked to his army to fight Romans were trained and drilled, sharing camp with
the Spanish veterans. Their integration would prove decisive in the coming conflicts: large,
decisive battles on Italian soil.
The Battle of Trebia, December 218 BCE
The first battle between Rome and Carthage in the Second Punic demonstrates the
discipline and unit cooperation instilled in the mercenaries by the Barcid military system. The
Roman general, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, had in his army numbered around 40,000 men,
with the infantry consisting of about 20,000 Latin allied soldiers and and 16,000 Roman citizens.
Opposing the Roman infantry, Hannibal at this point had 20,000 Iberian, Celtic, and Libyan
infantry.173 Despite the Roman infantry outnumbering him almost 2 to 1 however, Hannibal had
cavalry superiority and elephants.
The Roman army camped along the river Trebia in a strong defensive position. The
Carthaginians were encamped in an open plain so the Romans were not concerned about a
possible ambush. Yet ambush was precisely what Hannibal had in mind. Hannibal lured the
Roman army into his chosen ambush site by harassing his force with the Numidian cavalry. The
Romans chased the Numidians out of their camp and continued to pursue them. This pursuit took
place throughout the cold winter morning, and sapped the strength of the Roman infantry.
As the Numidian cavalry effected a gradual withdrawal, keeping close enough to the
Romans to encourage pursuit, Hannibal’s light infantry formed a screen across the open plain in
which the ambush was to take place. The coordination between the Numidian cavalry who were
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veteran units of Hamilcar’s campaigns, and the green Celtic units in the light infantry screen is
indicative of how quickly newer recruits could be incorporated into the disciplined army. Behind
the light infantry screen was the main infantry line of the Carthaginians. In the center was placed
most of new Celtic warriors, who numbered about 8,000. The more experienced Libyans and
Spaniards were positioned on either flank.174
When Longus finally saw the main line of Carthaginian infantry he formed his own battle
line, trusting in the superiority and numerical advantage of his infantry. His heavy infantry alone
outnumbered the Carthaginians, and were more heavily armored besides. Hannibal’s Balearic
slingers advanced just as the Numidians retired, expertly picking off some of the Roman infantry
with their famed accuracy. This cause great disruption in the Roman front line. If the
coordination between the new Celtic recruits and the veteran Numidian horse was impressive,
the coordination between the veteran slingers and veteran Numidian cavalry was remarkable.
Eventually the Roman infantry finished deployment, and began advancing toward
Hannibal’s fresh troops. As the Hastati approached, Hannibal ordered his cavalry to attack the
Roman cavalry who were by this point positioned on the wings of the extended Roman line. The
Carthaginian mercenary cavalry quickly outflanked and routed the Roman cavalry.
As the cavalry put pressure the Roman flanks, the Roman forces in the center of the line
fighting the Celts threatened to rip Hannibal’s lines in two. It was then that Hannibal’s ambush
was sprung. The Roman foot was encircled. The Romans in the center, fighting the less
disciplined Celts, did manage to punch a hole through the Carthaginian line which allowed some
10,000 Roman troops to escape. The newer Celtic troops were still the weakest in the army, due
in part to their lack of discipline and exposure to the Barcid system. The rest of the army fought
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in a coordinated and disciplined fashion, with one arm of the army supporting the other in a
unified battle plan. The Celts, not used to fighting in such a system and not yet accustomed to the
Barcid system, performed poorly and this is what allowed the Roman breakthrough.
The Battle of Lake Trasimene, June of 217 BCE
Lake Trasimene is an example of even more impressive discipline and coordination.
While the ambushing force at Trebia was a small detachment led by a trusted Punic officer, at
Lake Trasimene the ambushing force was virtually the entire Carthaginian army, and remains to
this day the largest ambush in military history. By this point the Celtic troops had been
assimilated into the Barcid system. Celtic troops, and the mercenaries in general, displayed in
this battle exquisite discipline and coordination, executing Hannibal’s battle plan nearly
flawlessly.
In June of 217 BCE, the new consul who commanded the Roman army was a man named
Flaminius. Hannibal awaited the coming of Flaminius’ army. Hannibal positioned his troops in
the hills of Cremona, which stood to one side of road with Lake Trasimene. The road between
the forested hills and the lake was narrow and hemmed in, and an obvious site for an ambush.
Hannibal positioned his camp on a hill near the road and beyond the lake. This camp was
presented as bait to the Romans, along with a small portion of the Carthaginian force acting to
defend it. Hannibal placed his experienced Libyan and Iberian foot in a defensive line on this
hill, directly between Flaminius’s line of advance and Hannibal’s own camp. The slingers and
light infantry Hannibal concealed in the hills nearer the camp along the road, and gave them
strict orders to remain silent and only come out when the Roman army had reached his heavy
infantry line. The Celts and the majority of the cavalry were placed on the hills farther from the
camp, and ordered to await the coming of the Romans in silence. Hannibal trusted the Celts, who

74

were stereotyped by Polybius as having little patience and a short temper, to wait until the entire
Roman army had been lured into the trap before it was sprung shut.175 This trust by Hannibal
indicates the training and assimilation that the Celts underwent in between Trebia and
Trasimene.
Flaminius’s army marched into Hannibal’s’ prepared trap. Surprise was essential to
Hannibal’s plan, and if the Romans became aware of his trap, or had appropriate time to react
and respond, the trap would not fully succeed. If anything like a proper battle line was organized
on the Roman side, casualties among the lightly armored Celts would be enormous. All of
Hannibal’s units needed to attack at the same time along the entirety of the line in order to
maximize the element of surprise and drive the Roman forces back into the lake. This was
extremely difficult, however, as Hannibal’s battle line was long, his troops divided by language,
and the day was misty. Orders needed to arrive to each detachment at around the same time, or
else the Carthaginians would attack the Romans piecemeal rather than crashing on their line all
together, in a great wave. Further, the plan depended on not even one commander or soldier out
of the tens of thousands waiting in ambush to lose his cool or make noise.176
It is testament to the astounding discipline and competency of the army that the orders
were given at the same time, and that the ambush force remained undetected. Suddenly, all
across the line, the various units of light infantry, cavalry, and missile troops attacked at once.
Gaining momentum from charging downhill into the road, the Roman marching formations were
immediately thrown into disarray. The Carthaginian mercenaries appeared out of the mist,
throwing confusion into Roman forces, which was compounded as Flaminius himself was

175
176

Ibid, 3.83
Ibid.

75

quickly identified and killed by a Celtic company.177 Nearly the entirety of Flaminius’s army was
destroyed, with Hannibal capturing at least 15,000 Romans, while only losing between 1,500 and
2,500 men himself (mostly Celts).178 The mercenaries gathered a great deal of loot from the
enemy, including armor and weapons. After Trasimene, the Libyans forsook their traditional
armor and equipped themselves as Roman legionnaires.179 Pulling off an ambush of this scale
would have been difficult for any ancient army, let alone a multilingual force, yet the Barcid
system’s emphasis on discipline and unit coordination allowed the mercenary army to succeed.
Cannae, April 216 BCE
This battle is not only crucially important to the understanding of the Second Punic War,
but it also displays the trained, disciplined, and loyal troops produced by the Barcid system,
(though loyal to Hannibal, not the system itself) and demonstrates the capability of not just
Hannibal himself, but also of his officer corps, to which the various units of his army were
loyally attached. The Battle of Cannae would prove to be Hannibal’s greatest and most complete
victory, convincing several Roman allies, like the major cities of Capua and Tarentum, to defect.
The slaughter of the Roman army remains to this day one of the bloodiest single days in history,
producing greater casualties than the British suffered on the first day of the Somme, and greater
deaths than the Battle of Gettysburg.180
Following Trasimene and Trebia, the Romans finally began to fear Hannibal and his
mercenaries. To counter them, Rome massed a huge force of 8 legions, totaling some 6,000
Roman and allied cavalry, and an astonishing 70,000 infantry, 55,000 of which were heavy
infantry. In comparison, Hannibal had 10,000 cavalry, the majority of whom were Spanish and
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Gallic, and 40,000 infantry, 10,000 of whom were light. Of this infantry, the majority were Celts,
approximately 9,000 were Libyan, and there was around 4,000 remaining Spanish.181 Despite
this great discrepancy in infantry forces, Hannibal was willing to give battle, and provoked the
enormous Roman army into battle by seizing an important supply base near a small town called
Cannae.
The Romans formed their great mass of infantry (the largest army Rome had ever raised)
into a dense manipular formation, deeper than their standard deployment. The idea behind this
deployment appears to have been twofold: because of the depth of the army, those in the front
ranks had little opportunity to flee the battle, and this was a concern as many of the Roman
soldiers were recently raised citizens and farmers, while Hannibal’s soldiers were professionals.
This deployment shows the fear that the mercenary army had begun to inflict on the Romans,
who previously had been contemptuous of mercenaries. The other idea behind the Roman
deployment was to create an unstoppable mass of men who could simply punch through
Hannibal’s line with brute strength. While a simplistic strategy, attempting anything more
complex with the inexperienced army the Romans possessed was extremely difficult. Cavalry
was deployed on the Roman wings, perhaps 3,000 on each wing. The main purpose of these
troops was to simply guard the flanks of the Roman infantry as the massive line, which extended
about a mile despite its depth, crushed Hannibal’s lighter and less numerous infantry.
Hannibal saw the Romans deploy their army first, and so learned their plans. Hannibal
prepared a light infantry screen, composed primarily of Libyans, to guard his force while the rest
of his own army deployed on the Cannae plain. Hannibal arranged his heavy infantry, his Celts
and Spanish, in the center of his army, in a convex formation with the bulge toward the Roman
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line. Units of Spanish were mixed with the units of Celts, indicating that by the point the Celtic
recruits were fully integrated into the army. On the Carthaginian left wing Hannibal deployed all
of his close order cavalry, while on the right he deployed what survived on his Numidian
cavalry. This made his left wing much stronger than his right, though the Romans do not seemed
to have cared much, as they were intent on driving Hannibal in the center.
At the same time, Hannibal ordered his cavalry on both flanks to attack. The
Carthaginian left wing smashed into its Roman counterpart, routing them utterly. On the right,
the Numidian cavalry harassed the Roman cavalry with a steady barrage of javelins.
As the Celtic and Gallic left routed the Romans, it began to pursue them off of the field,
nearly dashing Hannibal’s chance of victory. In a great display of leadership and discipline, the
Punic commander of the heavy horse managed to, in the heat of battle, stop the thousands of
charging cavalrymen and redirect them to assist the Numidians. Crossing the whole of the
battlefield to engage the Romans on the other wing, the Hannibal’s heavy cavalry, with close
Numidian assistance, drove the remainder of the Roman cavalry off the field.182
In the infantry fight, the mass of Roman heavy infantry formations was engaged in a
vicious fight with the Carthaginians. The light infantry screen Hannibal had initially deployed
repositioned on the flanks, protected from the Romans by the bulge in the Carthaginians line.
This bulge was what the Roman infantry naturally encountered first, and they fought the lightly
armored Celts, and drove them back. What had been a convex bulge in the Carthaginian line was
pushed back, and further back, step by retreating step, until the shape of line was now conclave,
and the whole line in danger of collapse. It looked like the Celtic line would collapse again, as it
had at Trebia. Hannibal himself rode up and down the Celtic portion of his line, yelling
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exhortations to his troops and telling them not to despair. It is indicative of the trust Hannibal
placed in his officer corps that he trusted his subordinates to affect the complex cavalry and
infantry maneuverings necessary for victory, while he oversaw the more static, but far more
brutal infantry fight. It is a testament to the discipline of the mercenary Celts that they did not
break or run; this ran counter to the literary trope of the Celt as a fickle and lazy fighter. 183 As the
Romans saw the center of the Carthaginian formation near collapse, more and more Roman
heavy infantry poured into that area, hoping for a breakthrough. The Celtic retreat backward
stayed a disciplined and measured retreat, not buckling under Roman pressure, a true testament
to the transformative power of the Barcid system inspired decades ago by Xanthippus.
At this point, the light infantry screen of Libyans which had redeployed to the far flanks
of the infantry line swung forward, encircling the Roman maniples along three sides. As the
confusion and exhaustion of battlefield took effect the Roman formations began to collapse and
the mass of Roman infantry more resembled a tightly packed mob rather than an orderly body of
soldiers. Sealing the fate of the Roman infantry, the now unopposed Carthaginian cavalry were
again redirected from the pursuit of the fleeing Roman cavalry and directed to attack the Roman
rear. The Roman infantry, a total of about eight whole legions and the largest army ever raised
by Rome to this point was now encircled by a numerically inferior foe.
At the end of the battle, Hannibal had suffered a great many casualties, the plurality of
them Gauls, perhaps 10% of his total force. The Romans suffered far greater losses however. In
addition to the loss of eighty senators who were acting in the army as military tribunes and
officers, the Romans lost 45,000 infantry and half of their cavalry, in addition to the remaining
17,000 who escaped to camp only to surrender the next day. This was the greatest military
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disaster (with the possible exception of Adrianople) Rome would ever experience in her 1,000
year history. This Carthaginian victory showed what a disciplined and well led heterogeneous
force could accomplish against a larger but less flexible homogenous one.
Warfare in Italy after Cannae
Much less can be learned about the Carthaginian mercenaries after Cannae for two chief
reasons. First, most of the fighting after Cannae was not in large set-piece battles, but rather a
series of smaller sieges, maneuverings, and skirmishes which our sources describe in far less
detail. Secondly, after Cannae the most reliable primary source for the Punic Wars, Polybius,
becomes fragmentary, forcing the ancient historian to rely on the at best hyperbolic Livy, and
worse sources like Fabius Pictor. Detail and truth give way to entertainment, propaganda, and
literary tropes.184
What is known about the fight in Italy is that after Cannae several major Italian allies
defected to Hannibal’s side, including Apulia, Samnium, Bruttium, and even Campania. Large
battles were forsaken in favor of blockades, raids, and skirmishes. Hannibal recruited new armies
from among his new allies, but these Latin allies did not fare as well against the Roman military.
Hannibal would never be defeated on Italian soil, but his allies certainly were. Capua was
recaptured in 211 BCE, Taretum in 209 BCE. Hannibal would campaign in Italy for a total of
sixteen years, before being recalled to Africa to defend against a Roman invasion force led by
one of Rome’s greatest ever generals, Scipio Africanus.
The End of the Barcid System
Using Spain as base of operations, Scipio would incite a tribe of Numidians to revolt
against Carthage, and land in Africa itself with an overwhelming force. This aggressive move
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forced Hannibal to finally be recalled from Italy (after 16 years on campaign) to defend his
homeland. The final decisive action of the Second Punic War would occur on the plains of Zama,
a few miles from Carthage.
In the Battle of Zama, Hannibal would be defeated by the professional force of Scipio
Africanus. Despite fighting well, the mercenary veterans of Hannibal’s Italian Campaign would
be undone by the poor quality of the other units of the army, and by the superior infantry of
Rome. Hannibal, and Carthage, would lose the Second Punic War. Hannibal would continue to
fight against Rome, ultimately choosing suicide rather than submission. The Barcid system
would die with him. Other mercenary armies fought in the Second Punic War, fighting the
Romans in Spain, and one even landing in Genoa, in northern Italy.185 These armies did adopt
some of the tenets of the Barcid system, but were not nearly as successful as the mercenaries of
Hannibal. Part of the reason for this is that the Barcid system required a high skill in generalship
in order to wield effectively, and few Punic officers were as skilled as Hannibal.
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Conclusions
The mercenary system of Carthage is a unique system in history, which managed to bind
together men from disparate nations and languages into a cohesive fighting force. Initially, the
system suffered from both disloyalty and incompetence, though performed adequately enough to
meet Carthage’s needs against the Sicilians. During the First Punic War, Xanthippus transformed
the polyglot army which was led by unprofessional generals into a fantastically efficient army,
well-disciplined and well-led. Hamilcar, a professional general himself, took note of this success
and fought admirably against great odds in Sicily. The mercenary system’s drawbacks were
revealed in the Mercenary War, a war which nearly destroyed the city of Carthage itself.
Learning the expensive lessons of the Mercenary War, Hamilcar forged a professional and loyal
army in his Spanish conquests, with Spain acting as a kind of laboratory. That army campaigned
for twenty years before marching over the Alps into Italy, where it displayed how a mercenary
army could become an extension of its commander’s will. Under the brilliant leadership of
Hannibal, the mercenary army underwent significant change on the surface, mostly due to the
huge influx of Gauls and Latins into the army. The core of the army however, which consisted of
the veteran units that had campaigned in Spain, allowed the new Celtic regiments to be co-opted
into the army, and within a year had become part of the greatest army to ever march against
Rome.
In addition to being a poorly explored area of ancient history, study of Carthaginian
mercenaries is rewarding because it sheds light on the performance of mercenaries in the West.
Eastern mercenaries, especially Greek mercenaries, are well known and studied, mainly due to
the fact that more records survive about mercenaries in the East (particularly the work of
Xenophon). A mercenary was, at least in part, the sum of the various ethnic elements that
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constituted it. It is an established theory in military history that an army reflects the culture from
which it comes from.186 What then when the army in question is a multiethnic force of
mercenaries? The short answer is that there is no culture that informs how a mercenary army
operates, other than the Punic culture of the officers. The Punic officer corps was the only
unifying element within a Carthaginian mercenary army, and the officer corps was centered
around the commander. The Barcid system further ensured that the commanders of most of the
mercenary armies were from the Barcid family. It was the Barca’s military practicality rather
than culture which directed and formed the army, leading to a culturally impartial emphasis on
discipline, loyalty, and unit coordination. This, in turn, allowed the Carthaginian mercenary army
to triumph many times over the Roman army, a homogenous force which was directed by a
culture which emphasized battlefield valor and piety over military strategy.
This was outside the scope of this study, but details about the various peoples that made
up a Carthaginian mercenary army can be gained from studying the accounts of their
performance. In addition, studying how the ethnic elements of the mercenary army interact may
reveal how the different ethnicities of the ancient world viewed each other. For example, looking
at how the Celts of the Po Valley backed Hannibal in his invasion of Italy reveals as much about
the Celts as it does about the Carthaginians. Theorizing about how the Gauls were so quickly
incorporated into Hannibal’s army reveals information on the effectiveness of the Barcid system,
but it could also reveal elements within the Celtic culture that made their incorporation easier.
While this study was not the object of this paper, such a study would be both interesting and
valuable.
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Finally, the mercenaries of Carthage matter for understanding how the Punic Wars were
fought and lost by the Carthaginians. The waging of the Second Punic War pitted two very
different military systems against each other; the multiethnic mercenary system of Carthage and
the homogenous, manipular system of the Romans. The simple fact that the homogenous
maniple system wasn’t automatically more successful against the Carthaginian system, with its
perceived drawbacks in communication, loyalty, and unit coordination is worthy of study. 187 The
heterogeneous system actually proved more than a match for the Roman system. Despite
whatever disadvantages the Barcid system hadn’t dealt with, the mercenary system was able to
field a wider array of units than the manipular formations of the Romans. This, along with the
emphasis on cavalry rather than on citizen infantry, gave the Carthaginian system valuable
flexibility, which a commander like Hannibal ruthlessly exploited to nearly destroy the Roman
Republic.
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